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20 YALE J. L. & TECH. 376 (2018)
State-sponsored cyber-attacks are on the rise and show no signs
of abating. Despite the threats posed by these attacks, the states
responsible frequently escape with impunity because of the difficulty
in attributing cyber-attacks to their source. As a result, current
scholarship has focused almost exclusively on overcoming the
technological barriers to attribution.
This Note suggests that a legal approach, rather than a
technological one, can solve the attribution problem. First, despite
the barriers to attribution, computer scientists have developed a
range of tools to trace cyber-attacks, and empirically, large-scale
state attacks tend to leave behind enough footprints (or
circumstantial evidence) to lead forensic experts to their source.
Second, the law does not demand guaranteed certainty, but only a
sufficient degree of certainty that someone is responsible; the
question of what counts as a sufficient degree of certainty is an
answerable, purely legal question. Thus, the question is no longer
whether cyber-attacks can be attributed; instead, it is how the
international community might configure a system of law to do so.
By surveying the scope of existing procedural rules including
the features of adversarial and inquisitorial systems, burdens of
proof and persuasion, state responsibility doctrines, and rules
governing evidentiary production this Note explains how a system
of law can be created to address the seemingly unique problem of
identifying the source of cyber-attacks. In doing so, this Note lays
the groundwork for envisioning an international tribunal and
procedure for states to address the threats posed by state-sponsored
cyber-attacks.
Delbert Tran is a member of the Yale Law School J.D. Class of 2018. He is
deeply grateful to Scott Shapiro, Joan Feigenbaum, Oona Hathaway, Allison
Douglis, Jeff Guo, Brian Mund, David Murdter, Adam Pan, and Phil Yao for
their thoughtful comments and suggestions.
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INTRODUCTION
Long after the conclusion of the 2016 presidential election in
the United States, the story of Russian hacking has lived on.
Public reports of Russian interference with the election first
arose on June 14, 2016, when the Washington Post reported that
Russian agents had compromised the Democratic National
Committee's information systems, leaking internal reports and
emails to the public. 2 After subsequent investigations, the
Department of Homeland Security and Director of National
Intelligence James Clapper announced on October 7, 2016, that
the U.S. intelligence community was "confident that the Russian
Government directed the recent compromises." 3 Intelligence
leaks to the New York Times and Washington Post in December
later confirmed that the instances of Russian hacking were acts
intentionally launched to sway the outcome of the election
towards Donald Trump.4 Though seventeen American agencies
agree that Russia is responsible for hacking the Democratic
National Committee (DNC) and Hillary Clinton's 2016
presidential campaign,5 then-President-elect Trump continued
to deny the fact of Russian interference, 6 only acknowledging
2 See Ellen Nakashima, Russian Government Hackers Penetrated DNC, Stole
Opposition Research on Trump, WASH. POST (June 14, 2016),
http://www. washingtonpost. com/world/national-security/russian-government-
hackers-penetrated-dnc-stole-opposition-research-on-
trump/2016/06/14/cf006cb4-316e- 1 le6-8ff7-7b6c 1998b7a0 story.html
[http://perma.cc/9APC-7QTA].
3 See Press Release, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Joint Statement from the
Department of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of National
Intelligence on Election Security (Oct. 7, 2016),
http:/www. dhs. gov/news/2016/10/07/joint-statement-department-homeland-
security-and-office-director-national [http://perma.cc/7LBQ-7PTN].
4 See Adam Entous, Ellen Nakashima & Greg Miller, Secret CIA Assessment




[http://perma.cc/GC8N-SALD]; David E. Sanger & Scott Shane, Russian
Hackers Acted To Aid Trump in Election, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/09/us/obama-russia-election-hack.html
[http://perma.cc/DNF3-E89W].
5 See Domenico Montaro & Brian Naylor, On Intelligence and Russian Hacking,




6 During the second presidential debate, Trump dismissed the idea of Russia
being responsible for the hack of the DNC. He continued making such
statements in December after he had won the election, saying in an interview
that reports of Russian hacking were "ridiculous" and that U.S. intelligence
3
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the possibility for the first time on January 11, 2017.7 Russian
presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov declared that the United
States "should either stop talking about [Russia being
responsible for the DNC hack] or produce some proof at last."
8
Although the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
has since publicly published its most detailed report concluding
that Russia was responsible for the DNC hack, the twenty-five
page report says little about the evidence the agencies have
establishing Russia's involvement in the hacks.9 Even though
U.S. intelligence agencies may have legitimate reasons for
withholding the basis for their attribution, 10 absent the
presentation of their evidence, the subsequent space of
uncertainty has allowed many across the political spectrum to
question the validity of the claim put forth by the agencies."l
Continued doubt about such attribution has served to frustrate
the possibility of more forward-looking discussions on how to
respond to such cyber-attacks, and muddles the picture for
future policy decisions.
12
had "no idea" if Russia was behind the hacking. See Justin Fishel & Veronica
Stacqualursi, A Timeline of Russia's Hacking into US Political Organizations




7 See David Nakamura & Abby Phillip, Trump Acknowledges Russian
Involvement in Meddling in U.S. Elections, WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2017),




8 See Laura Smith-Spark, Russia Challenges US to Prove Campaign Hacking
Claims or Shut Up, CNN (Dec. 16, 2016, 4:49 PM),
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/12/16/europe/russia-us-hacking-claims-
peskov/index.html [http://perma.cc/77NG-LKEE].
9 See David A. Graham, An Intelligence Report that Will Change No One's Mind,
ATLANTIC (Jan. 6, 2017),
http://www. theatlanticcom/politics/archive/2017/01/odni-report -on-russian-
hacking/512465 [http://perma.cc/M5ZX-SPEP].
10 It is entirely possible, if not probable, that much of the evidence they have
acquired may be derived from covert intelligence operations, and the agencies
may not have a method of revealing such evidence without revealing the
corresponding covert operations. Such a problem is discussed infra Section
II.A.4.
11 Sam Biddle, Here's the Public Evidence Russia Hacked the DNC It's Not
Enough, INTERCEPT (Dec. 14, 2016, 8:30 AM),
http://theintercept.com/2016/12/14/heres-the-public-evidence-russia-hacked-
the-dnc-its-not-enough/ [http://perma.cc/Q7Y7-VFQX ]; Catherine Herridge &
Pamela K. Browne, 'Guccifer' Casts Doubt on Obama Administration's Russia
Hacking Claims, Fox NEWS (Jan. 4, 2017),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/01/04/guccifer-casts-doubt-on-obama-
administrations-russia-hacking-claims.html [http://perma.cc/TLA4-PXUV].
12 See, e.g., Martin Matishak, Trump Hasn't Directed NSA Chief to Strike Back
at Russian Hackers, POLITICO (Feb. 27, 2018, 3:38 PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2018/02/27/trump-russia-hackers-nsa-response-
4
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This situation captures the severity of the threats facing a
country's cybersecurity, and the equally important task of
creating a legal structure for attributing attacks to those who
are responsible. Cyber-attacks 13 -in particular, large-scale,
state-sponsored cyber-attacks-have the potential to cause
significant and wide-ranging harm across a number of critical
arenas. These attacks include targeted attacks against nuclear
infrastructure (Stuxnet14), attacks against commercial entities
368241 [http://perma.cc/4CT9-AS4H].
13 By cyber-attack, I refer to the definition used by Oona Hathaway and her co-
authors as "any action taken to undermine the functions of a computer network
for a political or national security purpose." Oona Hathaway et al., The Law of
Cyber-Attack, 100 CAL. L. REV. 817, 826 (2012). The definition of a cyber-attack
has been subject to much debate, and it is a topic which Hathaway et al. explore
at length. See id. at 822-37, 881. For example, U.S. Cyber Command uses a
different definition of cyber-attacks, identifying them as those "that cause
physical damage to property or injury to persons." Id. at 821 n.9. But the Cyber
Command definition is under-inclusive, especially in light of the DNC hack,
which did not cause physical damage to property or persons, but still raises
significant national security concerns about one state's efforts to interfere with
the core democratic processes of another state.
By using Hathaway et al.'s definition, I focus the inquiry of this paper on
larger-scale, state-sponsored attacks, with parameters broad enough to include
attacks such as the DNC hack. As Hathaway et al. note, the stipulation that
cyber-attacks are done "for a political or national security purpose" serves to
identify cyber-attacks as "[any aggressive action taken by a state actor in the
cyber-domain," and distinguishes them from any run-of-the-mill "cyber-crime
... such as ... Internet fraud, identity-theft, and intellectual property piracy."
Id. at 830. Additionally, I use the term "cyber-attack" instead of "cyber-
warfare" because cyber-warfare identifies a narrower set of cyber-attacks that
"constitute armed attacks or that occur in the context of an ongoing armed
conflict." Id. at 821. An "armed attack" is itself a term in international law that
generally refers to a physical attack sufficiently serious to be cognizable under
the laws of war, which include state rights to use armed force in self-defense.
See U.N. Charter art. 2, 4; see also Daniel B. Silver, Computer Network Attack
as a Use of Force Under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, in
COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 73, 80-82 (Michael N.
Schmitt & Brian T. O'Donnell eds., 2002). Thus, the meaning of "cyber-
warfare" is akin to the definition of "cyber-attack" used by Cyber Command,
which is under-inclusive with respect to major hacks that interfere with a
nation's security without damaging their property or persons. The term "cyber-
attack" is preferable since it is a broader umbrella that includes cyber-warfare,
but also includes the many cyber-attacks that fall short of armed conflict but
still merit some form of sanctions, even if they fall short of meriting armed
force as a response. See discussion infra Section H.A.
Hathaway's definition of cyber-attack also differentiates cyber-attacks
from cyber-espionage. See Hathaway et al., supra, at 829 ("By contrast, neither
cyber-espionage nor cyber-exploitation constitutes a cyber-attack because
these concepts do not involve altering computer networks in a way that affects
their current or future ability to function."). Cyber-espionage poses its own
distinct challenges, and is a challenge best addressed in its own terms. See,
e.g., Ashley Deeks, An International Legal Framework for Surveillance, 55 VA.
J. INT LL. 291, 300 (2015); Asaf Lubin, "We Only Spy on Foreigners": The Myth
of a Universal Right to Privacy and the Practice of Foreign Mass Surveillance,
18 CHI. J. INT'L L. 501 (2018).
14 See Kim Zetter, An Unprecedented Look at Stuxnet, the World's First Digital
5
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(the Sony hack15), attacks against government infrastructure
(the Estonia DDOS attack 16 ), and attacks against the
infrastructure of the internet itself (the Mirai botnet attack17).
The threat posed by these attacks even prompted Clapper to
note that in 2013, cyber-attacks surpassed terrorism on the
United States' list of national threats. 18 And, as the recent DNC
hack demonstrates, such cyber-attacks show no sign of abating.
While the persistence of cyber-attacks may be due, in part, to
their relatively low cost, 19 the difficulty in tracing these attacks
to their source may also play a significant role. As a result, cyber-
attacks provide a perfect venue for state actors to engage in
malicious activity without fear of attribution or retribution,
allowing them to strike with impunity.
The issue of state attribution has long been a problem in the
realm of cybersecurity. While architectural anonymity has been
one of the defining hallmarks and strengths of the internet, it
also is the source of this confounding problem. Though most
prior scholarship has focused on technological barriers to
attribution, this Note seeks to examine this problem anew by
focusing on how the law, not technology, can resolve the problem
of attribution. Though attribution has long been thought of as a
technical problem, the technical barrier to attribution presents
a much narrower problem than the one presented by legal
attribution. Technological attribution zooms in on the narrower
question of whether or not one can possibly guarantee an
attribution of an attack to individual(s) purely through
technological means.20 But as legal scholars and practitioners of
Weapon, WIRE (Nov. 3, 2014, 6:30 AM),
http://www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-to-zero-day-stuxnet
[http://perma.cc/Q79F-JW2J].




16 See Stephen Herzog, Revisiting the Estonian Cyber Attacks: Digital Threats
and Multinational Responses, 4 J. STRATEGIC SECURITY 49 (2011).
17 See Lily Hay Newman, The Web-Shaking Mirai Botnet is Splintering But also
Evolving, WIRED (Nov. 15, 2016, 7:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2016/11/web-
shaking-mirai-botnet -splintering-also-evolving [http://perma.cc/55TG-LPRK].
18 See Aaron Boyd, DNI Clapper: Cyber Bigger Threat Than Terrorism, FED.
TIMES (Feb. 4, 2016),
http://www.federaltimes.com/story/government/it/management/2016/02/04/irs
-hardware-failure/79811920 [http://perma.cc/YGU4-STKK.
19 See W. Earl Boerbert, A Survey of Challenges in Attribution, PROCEEDINGS OF
A WORKSHOP ON DETERRING CYBERATTACKS: INFORMING STRATEGIES AND
DEVELOPING OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 43 (2010) ("The amount of information
on the Internet about malicious functionality is so large that a relatively low
level of technical competence is required to exploit it.").
20 Although "attribution" as a term can more generally refer to discovering the
cause behind an action, I use the term "attribution" here to refer to the process
of identifying the actor behind a cyber-attack. See DAVID A. WHEELER &
GREGORY N. LARSEN, INST. FOR DEF. ANALYSES, TECHNIQUES FOR CYBER ATTACK
6
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law know, questions of responsibility are rarely decided solely
through a single technological tool or form of evidence, and
judgments of responsibility often do not turn upon smoking-gun
declarations of guilt. Judgments of law are frequently based on
heavy accumulations of evidence, either direct or circumstantial,
that in their totality paint a picture of responsibility for
malicious behavior.21 And the very same logic applies to the
context of cybersecurity and attribution. The real question, then,
is how to create a legal system with sufficient rules of evidence
and procedure to legitimize its legal judgments identifying a
party as the cause of a cyber-attack.
22
While this cybersecurity problem emerges at the intersection
of policy and technology, it also presents a particularly
appropriate problem for the law to resolve. If, fundamentally,
law concerns the system by which parties adjudicate disputes,
then the question of attributing a cyber-attack raises precisely
such a dispute that the law can address. A legal process also
bestows the outcome with greater legitimacy and formalizes
such resolution with greater institutional weight. And in a more
contentious and politicized environment where all reports are
held under suspicion of partisan bias, a conclusion derived from
legal process is more difficult to dismiss as mere "fake news."23
Further, once the state culprits of cyber-attacks are known, their
tactics and methodologies can be studied, retaliation can be
threatened, countermeasures can rectify past incursions, and
norms for appropriate behavior can be established and
entrenched. But he inability to determine the source of attack
ATTRIBUTION 1 (2003).
21 See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99-100 (2003) (stating that the
Court has "often acknowledged the utility of circumstantial evidence in
discrimination cases" and that "[t]he adequacy of circumstantial evidence also
extends beyond civil cases; [the Supreme Court] has never questioned the
sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in support of a criminal conviction.");
Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("I would
reject, however, the Court of Appeals' statement hat the plaintiff must present
direct, as opposed to circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence may be
as probative as testimonial evidence."); Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121,
140 (1954) ("Circumstantial evidence in this respect is intrinsically no different
from testimonial evidence.").
22 Other scholars have called for the creation of new legal frameworks to address
the issues that arise in cyber-attack. Duncan B. Hollis, for example, called for
the creation of an "International Law for Information Operations." See Why
States Need an International Law for Information Operations Symposium:
Crimes, War Crimes, and the War on Terror, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1023
(2007). As Hollis himself states, however, his article "does not aim to offer any
specific content for an [International Law for Information Operations], but
rather seeks to address the threshold question of why states need an ILIO in
the first place." Id. at 1029.
23 See, e.g., Nicholas Loffredo, 'Fake News' Cries Follow Discovery of Russian
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frustrates each and every one of these possible responses.
Attribution allows the law to emerge after answering a key
requisite question: which state, if any, is responsible for
conducting the cyber-attack?
Practically speaking, the law of attribution would legitimize
certain sanctions against another state under international law,
including the possible use of military force in self-defense under
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.24 Conversely, a state's failure to
prove its claim of attribution could have the subsequent effect of
making any sanctions that it pursued illegitimate or invalid
under international law. A legal framework for attribution
would provide a critical stepping-stone for enabling a regime to
restrict and redress the harms of state-sponsored cyber-attacks.
This Note proceeds to envision a law of attribution in
several parts. Part I first reviews the problem of attribution: the
threats posed by recent cyber-attacks, the problematic lack of
accountability for such attacks, and the general technological
barriers that scholars and policymakers generally have
understood to prevent cyber-attack attribution. Part I then
rebuts the longstanding inability to attribute cyber-attacks by
asserting that the technological question of attribution is much
narrower than that required by law, and demonstrates how
attribution instead reflects a more readily resolved legal
question. Part II then envisions a framework for an
international law of attribution. First, it outlines the contextual
background and significant considerations for assessing state
responsibility for the behavior of non-state actors. Part II will
suggest procedural and legal rules not only to imagine what a
law of attribution would look like, but also how its procedural
rules will bear an appropriate and reasoned relationship to its
substance. Part III addresses the most difficult element of a law
of attribution: the possible incentives for states to join or
participate in such a legal arrangement. While the assessment
of state incentives raises a much broader general question about
the nature of international relations and issues of state
cooperation and compliance, this Note limits its survey to the
various past instances of international tribunals or modes of
international adjudication that could serve as models for the
proposed law of attribution.
I. THE PROBLEM OF STATE ATTRIBUTION
How do you stop an adversary when you don't even know who
they are? The inability to identify the source of a cyber-attack
allows actors to employ such attacks with impunity, frustrating
efforts at creating international laws or treaties to regulate this
harmful behavior. Even in cases where formal law is not the
24 U.N. Charter art. 51. See discussion infra Section I.A for further discussion
on the particular sanctions that might be justified under the law of attribution.
383
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answer-where cyber-attacks might be best dealt with through
ad-hoc state-to-state interactions-states would still need to
attribute an attack in order to employ any informal means of
sanctioning the aggressor and their behavior. Thus, the
attribution problem is crucial, because attribution is the key
prerequisite to any attempt at imposing rules or restrictions on
malicious cyber-attacks. As others have noted, "Attribution of a
cyber attack to a state is a, if not the, key element in building a
functioning regime."
25
The current international regime does little to expressly
regulate or control states' conduct in the realm of cyber-hacking.
No international laws or treaties expressly regulate the use of
cyber-attacks. 26 And while scholars point to the potential
application of the law of armed conflict, such law has notably not
been invoked thus far to respond to cyber-attacks.27 Given the
general uncertainty in the field of international relations, states
may understandably be risk-averse, and hesitate to employ such
innovative interpretations of international law when it comes to
legal and diplomatic action against other states. The absence of
attribution therefore limits institutional and legal solutions,
perpetuating the cyber arena's status as essentially an
international Wild West, with continued prospects of escalation
and uncertainty about the scope and magnitude of future cyber-
attacks.
28
25 Scott J. Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks
in International Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INTL L. 191, 232 (2009).
26 The recently released Tallinn Manual 2.0, for example, surveys the realm of
all relevant "specialized regimes of international law and eyberspace," and
includes discussion of international human rights law, diplomatic and consular
law, law of the sea, air law, space law, and international telecommunications
law. None of these categories explicitly set out a regulatory regime for cyber-
attacks, eyber-hacking, or cyber espionage. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS (Michael N. Schmitt
ed., 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0]. In fact, the Tallinn manual
directly acknowledges that some cyber operations, such as cyber espionage, fall
under no per se regulations in international law. Id. at 168; see also Deeks,
supra note 13, at 300 ("[M]ost scholars agree that international law either fails
to regulate spying or affirmatively permits it.").
27 See, e.g., Hathaway et al., supra note 13, at 817 (noting that "existing
international legal frameworks offer only embryonic or piecemeal protection").
28 See, e.g., Jamie Condliffe, Security Experts Agree: The NSA Was Hacked, MIT
TECH. REV. (Aug. 18, 2016),
http://www.technologyreview.com/s/602201/security-experts-agree-the-nsa-
was-hacked [http://perma.cc/6ABU-URGC]; Alex Kreilein, Amid Growing U.S.
Cybersecurity Threat, A Critical Lack of Trained Experts, DENVER POST (Sept.
24, 2016, 5:51 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/2016/09/24/amid-growing-u-s-
cybersecurity-threat-a-critical-lack-of-trained-experts [http://perma.cc/5GP3-
WU7P]; John Ribeiro, Obama Aims To Avoid a 'Cycle of Escalation' in
Cyberattacks by Countries, PC WORLD (Sep. 6, 2016, 3:08 PM),
http://www.pcworld.idg.com. au/article/606336/obama-aims-avoid-cycle-
escalation-cyberattacks-by-countries [http://perma.cc/7X6R-RHSY]; Tom
Risen, Iran's Growing Cybersecurity Threat, U.S. NEWS (Dec. 15, 2014, 11:15
2018
9
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From the perspective of international relations theory more
generally, attribution provides the linchpin to the development
of international law. It would be easy to see why attribution of
cyber-aggressors is needed for liberal theorists to impose
institutions of law, since the collateral effects of cyber-attacks on
domestic entities29 create plenty of incentives for domestic actors
to encourage state actors to buy into an international framework
for curbing such attacks. 30 But even international relations
realists would recognize the necessity of attribution for states to
maintain order, even in the absence of an overarching
international law. The realists' traditional mantra denies any
central authority above states, and believes states are always
seeking power and to advance their self-interest.31 While this
understanding of international relations poses an initial hurdle
to international cooperation or international law, the realist
logic does not fully preclude cooperation. One counterargument
is made through reciprocity. 32 Derived from game theory,
advocates of reciprocity point to the fact that rational, self-
interested actors who are given a choice between cooperation or
defection would optimally choose to cooperate given repeat
iterations of the game.33 The choice to cooperate occurs because
players punish or reward the others' behaviors in future "games"
(or interactions) based off the decisions made in prior
iterations. 34 Thus, even assuming the realist framework for
state behavior, reciprocity allows international laws to form in
the process of cooperation, since international relations often
involves repeat interactions between states that form the
"iterations" of the international relations game.
Reciprocity, however, assumes that states can accurately
punish or reward each other's behavior. Although
countermeasures may present such a response, the proper use of
countermeasures is inextricably tied to proper attribution.35 Not
AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/12/15/irans-growing-
cybersecurity-threat [http://perma.ce/CB4W-LF9M].
29 See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 14-15.
30 See Andrew Moravcsik, Liberal Theories of International Law, in
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 92-94 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack
eds., 2014).
31 See, e.g., JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS, 29-40
(2001).
32 See Robert Keohane, Reciprocity in International Relations, 40 INT'L ORG. 1
(1986).
33 See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 20 (1984).
34 Id.
35 See, e.g., TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER
WARFARE 29 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 1.0]
("A State bears international responsibility for a cyber operation attributable
to it." (emphasis added)); Lee Ferran, The NSA is Likely 'Hacking Back'
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only is attribution a basic requirement for a state to sanction the
responsible malicious actor, but proper attribution is also
essential to a state claim of legitimate use of sanctions or
countermeasures. Law serves not only to determine the outcome
of a conflict; the law also serves to legitimize that outcome-
determination to third parties.36 The legitimizing function of law
rings especially true in the realm of international law and
international relations, where states lack an overarching
authority to compel compliance via force, and instead must
cooperate through norms established and legitimized by
customary international law.37 As noted previously, attribution
is an essential and necessary condition to further legal action.
But in order to take the appropriate legal response (whether
countermeasures, diplomatic answers, or responses of any other
kind), a state need not only identify the source of an attack.
States also must legitimize their attribution of an attack to other
state actors in order to justify any subsequent recourse or
countermeasure. Thus, attribution serves a twofold function in
a reciprocity regime: 1) identifying the wrongdoer and 2)
legitimizing formal or informal sanctioning behavior to third
parties. Consequently, the attribution question is the pivotal
first step to any system of law limiting the use of cyber-attacks.
A. Why is Attribution So Difficult?
The difficulty in tracing the source of a cyber-attack has long
plagued discussions of cybersecurity, and much of current
scholarship has accepted the traditional wisdom that the
technological architecture of the internet makes attribution an
exceedingly difficult problem.38 The trouble of attribution poses
squads/story?id=41010651 [http://perma.cc/ST2V-AACA] (mentioning
attribution six times in the context of US countermeasures).
36 See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE
SOCIOLOGY 31 (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds., 1968).
31 Jack L. Goldsmith, & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International
Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1113-14 (1999).
38 See P.W. SINGER & ALLAN FRIEDMAN, CYBERSECURITY AND CYBERWAR: WHAT
EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 73 (2014) ("Perhaps the most difficult problem is
that of attribution."); W. Earl Boebert, A Survey of Challenges in Attribution,
in PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP ON DETERRING CYBERATTACKS: INFORMING
STRATEGIES AND DEVELOPING OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY, 51-52 (2010) ("The
Internet contains intrinsic features and extrinsic services which support
anonymity and inhibit forensic attribution of cyberattacks."); Stephen Dycus,
Congress's Role in Cyber Warfare, 4 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 155, 163
(2010) ("[T]he apparent ease with which a cyber attack may be carried out
without attribution could make it impossible to fight back at all."); Herbert S.
Lin, Offensive Cyber Operations and the Use of Force, 4 J. NAT'L SECURITYL. &
POLY 63, 77 (2010) (describing attribution as a problem that "[n]o one has come
close to solving"); Aaron P. Brecher, Note, Cyberattacks and the Covert Action
Statute: Toward a Domestic Legal Framework for Offensive Cyberoperations,
111 MICH. L. REV. 423, 423 (2012) (saying that cyber-attacks "can be nearly
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a problem that has led scholars and experts to devote countless
works to discussing the issue of attribution,39 and its persistence
as a challenge led P.W. Singer and Allan Friedman to describe
attribution as "[p]erhaps the most difficult problem" in the cyber
arena.
40
Attributing cyber-attacks to their source is difficult for a
number of reasons. First, the structural design of the internet
and the nature of information transmission across networks
complicates attribution efforts. The following section entails a
brief discussion of the structure of the internet and how it
works.41
When a user wishes to do something through the internet-
for example, to search for a video of Corgi puppies on YouTube-
the user's computer needs to find a way to communicate with the
machine hosting YouTube's content, and have that machine
send the content of Corgis rollicking around to the original
machine. How does this happen? First, every machine is
assigned an Internet Protocol (IP) number that serves as its
"address." 42 This address is usually assigned by an internet
service provider or network, and the user's computer will
impossible to attribute definitively to their sources").
39 See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, At Light Speed: Attribution and Response to
Cybercrime/Terrorism/Warfare, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379 (2007);
Clement Guitton & Elaine Korzak, The Sophistication Criterion for
Attribution, 158 RUSI J. 62 (2013) (challenging the use of "sophistication" in
cyber attribution); Erik M. Mudrinich, Cyber 3.0: The Department of Defense
Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace and the Attribution Problem, 68 A.F.L.
REV. 167 (2012); Thomas Rid & Ben Buchanan, Attributing Cyber Attacks, 38
J. STRATEGIC STUD. 4, 4 (2014) ("[A]ttribution is commonly seen as one of the
most intractable technical problems"); Nicholas Tsagourias, Cyber Attacks,
Self-Defence and the Problem of Attribution, 17 J. CONFLICT & SECURITYL. 229,
229 (2012) (arguing that "international law standards for attributing attacks
to a State can cover the case of cyber attacks"); David D. Clark & Susan
Landau, Untangling Attribution, HARV. NAT. SEC. J. (Mar. 2011),
http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Vol.-2 Clark-
Landau Final-Version.pdf [http://perma.cc/TWQ4-S8D8] (identifying a need
for more manageable attribution); Jeffrey Hunker, Bob Hutchinson &
Jonathan Margulies, Role and Challenges for Sufficient Cyber-Attack
Attribution, INST. INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 5 (Jan. 2008); Lily Hay
Newman, Hacker Lexicon: What is the Attribution Problem?, WIRED (Dec. 24,
2016, 7:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2016/12/hacker-lexicon-attribution-
problem [http://perma.cc/QZC3-CEYG].
40 SINGER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at 73.
41 While this discussion may seem rudimentary to those familiar with computer
science or the infrastructure of the internet, this Note aims to answer a
technological question by proposing a legal solution, meaning that many actors
in this sphere may be legal or policy professionals with less familiarity with
the technical components of the internet. Thus, this Note presents a fairly
layperson-friendly description of the internet to communicate the technological
issues at play in attribution. Moreover, such explanations are important in
dispelling the mysticism surrounding cyber-technology, in order to emphasize
the ordinariness of the problems at issue and how legal regimes possess the
tools capable of resolving them.
42 JAMES GRIMMELMAN, INTERNET LAW: CASES AND PROBLEMS 30 (7th ed. 2017).
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generally start out with the address of the local internet router,
which will then relay the request o the wider internet.
To get the user's request to the machine with Corgis, the
user's machine will need to know the address of that machine.
How does the user's machine find this out? From the person's
perspective, she or he might type in "www.youtube.com" in the
search bar. On the machine end, these recognizable names are
translated to the machine address, or IP number, through the
Domain Name System, which can be thought of as a global
directory that matches website names to IP numbers.43 Once the
user's machine learns of the address of the website holding
bountiful bundles of puppy videos, the next step is for the data
from the user's computer (the request to retrieve content from
YouTube) to transmit to YouTube, and for YouTube to send the
requested data to the user's computer. To paint a simplified
picture of the process: the request (the text the user enters in an
address bar or the action of clicking a website link) is translated
into data (numbers) at the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
layer, which then passes the data to the transport and network
layers.44 At the transport layer, the data is broken down into
packet-sized chunks of data that each individually contain their
destination address, like little envelopes sent through the mail.
45
These packets are transmitted to various servers in the overall
network on the way to their destination (think thousands of
possible layover destinations on a long trip46), until they reach
the final destination and are reassembled into the original
request for data from YouTube.47 On the machine with YouTube
content, the process then repeats itself in the opposite direction
as YouTube sends its information back to the user.
This process of communication between two computers,
however, does not require that the source of a request (or a hack)
be known. The only reason YouTube knows where to send its
response is that the original request intentionally includes its
address so that YouTube can send data back. Other types of
activity-such as uploading a video to YouTube-do not need to
43 Id. at 35.
44 Id. at 33.
45 Id. at 30.
46 Furthermore, the path that a packet of information takes will change every
time, given the sheer number of different nodes that can be taken, and the fact
that packets and the transportation layer are designed to take the fastest
route-which changes at any given time based on the overall traffic that is
currently traveling through a system. See, e.g., Pablo Echenique, Jesfls G6mez-
Gardeies & Yamir Moreno, Improved Routing Strategies for Internet Traffic
Delivery, 70 PHysIcAL REV. E. 1 (2004) (analyzing different strategies aimed at
optimizing routing policies in the internet). This represents the fundamentally
decentralized nature of the system, and why it is difficult to accomplish
attribution by imposing various "checkpoints" in the internet, given the
countless other routes that information might otherwise take.
47 GRIMMELMAN, supra note 42, at 31-32.
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embed a return address in the information sent over. This
current structure of our internet thus does not require the
original source of a data transmission for our machines to
participate in online activity. The packets of data that we send
through the internet only need to know their destination, not
their source.48 Unlike at the post office, a return address is not
needed, since any data that fails to go through is lost, and one
can simply attempt another request again and again until it gets
through.
49
Second, users can employ a number of techniques and
program applications to hide their trail of online activity. To the
extent that any user's IP address is logged in any activity that
they perform on the internet, users have the option of using
proxy servers50 or onion-routing tools such as Tor to mask their
IP addresses when acting online.51 Think back to the post office
analogy. How might someone mask the origin of an envelope
sent through the mail? The sender could hand it to a friend, and
ask them to send it out through a different post office than the
local one closest to them. The sender could also "spoof' the
original address by writing down a fake return address.52 One
experiment concluded that nearly one third of internet users
could spoof their source IP addresses without detection.
53
Third, even if the internet could arduously be redesigned to
authenticate the source IP address of every bit of data sent over
48 Id. at 30; see also Jiangping Wu, Gang Ren & Xing Li, Source Address
Validation: Architecture and Protocol Design, IEEE CONF. NETWORK
PROTOCOLS (2007).
49 Id. at 31.
50 See Larry Greenemeier, Seeking Address: Why Cyber Attacks are so Difficult
To Trace Back to Hackers, SCI. AM. (June 11, 2011),
http://www. scientificamerican. com/article/tracking-cyber-hackers
[http://perma.cc/FY47-JCYN].
51 See, e.g., Joan Feigenbaum, Aaron Johnson & Paul Syverson, A Model of Onion
Routing with Provable Anonymity, 4886 FIN. CRYPTOGRAPHY & DATA SECURITY
57 (2007) (discussing masking online). Onion routing is a technique by which
a series of routers participation in an encryption network. Any client who seeks
to conduct online activity with anonymity then sends their internet
communications through the onion routing network. The client secures their
online communication with several layers of encryption, and selects a set of
onion routers that will each individually have the key to decrypt one layer of
encryption on the communication, until the communication ultimately reaches
its destination fully decrypted. Because each router only has a single layer of
decryption, no single router knows the overall path that the communication
takes.
52 See Matthew Tanase, IP Spoofing: An Introduction, SYMANTEC (Mar. 10, 2003),
http://www. symantec com/connect/articles/ip-spoofing-introduction
[http://perma.cc/5EGE-9RDV].
53 Robert Beverly et al., Understanding the Efficacy of Deployed Internet Source
Address Validation Filtering, IMC '09 1 (2009),
http://www.akamai.com/cn/zh/multimedia/documents/technical-
publication/understanding-the-efficacy-of-deployed-internet-source-address-
validation-filtering-technical-pubhcation.p df [http://perma.cc/YS 79-ZPJR].
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the internet, 54 these addresses would accomplish the goal of
merely identifying the source machine of an attack, and not a
person, thereby creating another degree of attenuation between
an attack and the attacker. There are innumerable situations
where attackers may steal or compromise another person's
device,55 or exploit public devices or networks used by multiple
persons (such as a library computer, or in the wireless network
of a coffee shop). The Mirai Botnet attack, for example, involved
malicious agents exploiting thousands of other devices that the
agents co-opted into the instruments of the attack.
56
Fourth, even if all the technological problems are overcome
and a particular person is identified as having launched a cyber-
attack, there remains the question of whether or not a sovereign
state can be held responsible for that individual's actions. In
other words, cyber-attacks also raise the question of when states
can be held responsible for the wrongdoing of non-state actors.
While this legal conundrum most frequently arises in the
54 While there are means of authenticating the source of internet activity, such
means are often limited. For example, applications that "certify" someone's
identity merely provide another layer of information that can be faked or
spoofed. See, e.g., Sean Gallagher, Turkish Government Agency Spoofed Google
Certificate 'Accidentally', ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 4, 2013),
http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/01/turkish-government-
agency-spoofed-google-certificate-accidentally [http://perma. cc/L5ZY-2TVV].
While some researchers have proposed network designs that might restructure
the internet to validate the source of behavior done online, see, e.g., J. Wu, A
Source Address Validation Architecture (SAVA) Testbed and Deployment
Experience, IETF (June 2008), http://tools.ietf. org/pdf/rfc5210.pdf
[http://perma.cc/D7KY-CDKF], such a change would require an immense,
structural overhaul to the entirety of the internet as we know it. These
researchers acknowledge that their designs are limited by the fact that their
designs, to be effective, would need "universal deployment," id. at 18, and that
there are a number of barriers to universal adoption, id. at 19 (including
significant coordination costs, significant resource costs, a dramatic shift
towards network centralization, and issues with emerging technologies and
interoperability). This design would also fail to deal with attacks by botnets,
since the botnets possess legitimate IP addresses (while masking the architect
behind the attack). Id.
Such a redesign would also functionally eliminate anonymity on the
internet, which raises a separate host of questions and concerns. See, e.g.,
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) ("Anonymity is
a shield from the tyranny of the majority."); Jason M. Shepard & Genelle
Belmas, Anonymity, Disclosure and First Amendment Balancing in the Internet
Era: Developments in Libel, Copyright, and Election Speech, 15 YALE J. L. &
TECH. 92 (2012).
55 This technique is used to create "zombie" computers or "botnets" that are then
used to launch attacks, often from an army of such devices. See Greenemeier,
supra note 50.
56 See Robinson Meyer, How a Bunch of Hacked DVR Machines Took Down
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context of terrorists or corporations,57 the issue is just as salient
for hackers and cyber-attackers, who generally lack a uniform or
flag to identify them as acting in the name of any particular
state. Note that this is not a technological barrier to attribution,
but a legal one.58 This particular concern highlights the need to
create a legal solution to the problems posed by attribution.
The internet's structural design, the tools for masking online
activity, the limitation of attribution to machines, and the limits
on attributing individual conduct to states comprise the
numerous hurdles, technological and legal, that have often been
cited as the barrier to the creation of a legal regime for
regulating cyber-attacks.59 While previous scholarship has often
viewed the technological problem of attribution as an intractable
difficulty best left to the engineers, recent scholarship has begun
to recognize that the attribution problem may not be the
impossible task it has been previously portrayed to be.60 While
these scholars have pointed out the possibility of a political
solution to the attribution puzzle, 61 these pieces fall shy of
proposing an actual legal or political framework6 2 to resolve the
attribution problem once and for all.
B. The Technological Attribution Problem
is a Red Herring
Despite the numerous technological barriers to attribution,
the technological problem is a red herring. These technical
obstacles only prevent us from reaching the very narrow
conclusion of when we might be absolutely certain that an agent
was responsible for a cyber-attack. The law, however, almost
never operates on the impossibly high standard of absolute
certainty. Even United States criminal law, with its famously
high burden of proof in favor of the defendant, demands only
that there be no reasonable doubt before a conviction, as opposed
51 See, e.g., Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations for Non-State-Actors:
Where are We Now?, in DOING PEACE THE RIGHTS WAY: ESSAYS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS IN HONOR OF LOUISE ARBOUR (Fannie
Lafontaine & Francois Larocque eds., 2015); Oona A. Hathaway et al.,
Ensuring Responsibility: Common Article 1 and State Responsibility for Non-
State Actors, 95 TEx. L. REv. 539 (2017); Derek Jinks, State Responsibility for
the Acts of Private Armed Groups, 4 CHI. J. INTL L. 83 (2003).
58 See Shackelford, supra note 25, at 233.
59 See, e.g., Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the
Future of Article 2(4), 36 YALE J. INT'L L. 421, 443-44 (2011).
60 See Rid & Buchanan, supra note 39, at 6 (explaining how actual attribution is
more common and nuanced of a phenomenon than previously thought, and that
the attribution issue is more of a political, rather than purely technological,
question).
61 Id.
62 See, e.g., id. at 33 (concluding simply that "the attribution process, a techno-
political problem, is what states make of it").
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to demanding that there be no doubt at all. 63 Upon
reexamination, the attribution question is, at its core, a question
of responsibility. And responsibility is a fundamentally legal
question, one that the law has frequently answered, even in
cases without absolute causal certainty. Thus, this Note resolves
the attribution problem through making two main points:
First: despite the barriers to attribution, computer scientists
have developed a range of tools to trace cyber-attacks, and
empirically, large-scale state attacks tend to leave behind
enough footprints (or circumstantial evidence) to lead forensic
experts to their source.
Second: the law does not demand guaranteed certainty, but
only a sufficient degree of certainty that someone is responsible;
the question of what counts as a sufficient degree of certainty is
an answerable, purely legal question.
Once these two points are established, the question is no
longer whether cyber-attacks can be attributed, but how the
international community might configure a system of law to do
so, developing the necessary rules of evidence, procedure,
burdens of proof, and so on.
On the first point, the emphasis on the technological nature
of attribution has naturally attracted much interest from those
with greater technical expertise, and computer scientists have
responded in turn by developing a suite of tools to attribute
cyber-attacks or intrusions.6 4 While none of these methods may
individually present silver-bullet solutions, each offers forensic
techniques that might shed some light on any particular case,
and that cumulatively present the very real possibility of a
confident degree of attribution. In the same way that anonymous
envelopes can be traced through forensic evidence (searching for
fingerprints, identifying handwriting, etc.), there are ways to
use circumstantial evidence to attribute the transmission of
digital information and subsequent cyber-attacks. 65 This is
especially true of the cyber-attacks explored by this Note-
namely high-profile cyber-attacks that are likely to trigger or
demand state responses. By virtue of their larger scope or scale,
63 See James Q. Whitman, The Origins of "Reasonable Doubt" 8 (Yale Law Sch.
Faculty Scholarship Series, 2005).
64 See, e.g., Rid & Buchanan, supra note 38, at 15-26 (describing a range of
analytic clues, ranging from atomic indicators to targeting analysis); Wheeler
& Larsen, supra note 20 (listing techniques such as store logs and traceback
inquiries, input debugging, modifying transmitted messages, transmitting
separate messages, reconfiguring and observing networks, querying hosts,
inserting host monitoring functions, stream matching, honey pots, forward-
deployed Intrusion Detection Systems, and network ingress filtering); Haining
Wang, Cheng Jin & Kang G. Shin, Defense Against Spoofed IP Traffic Using
Hop-Count Filtering, 15 IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS NETWORKING 40 (2007)
(describing a technical method of addressing the "spoofing" technique
described supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text).
65 These tools are both technical and contextual. See supra note 64.
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such attacks tend to be more likely to leave tracks behind. Bigger
operations also require greater resources, limiting the field of
potential adversaries capable of launching such cyber-attacks.66
In fact, investigators used these techniques to identify the
culprits of three recent major cyber-attacks: the Stuxnet attack,
the Sony attack, and the recent DNC hack. The following
sections review each attack in turn to describe how
accumulations of forensic and circumstantial evidence led to the
attribution of these attacks, thus demonstrating that the
technological problem of attribution is overstated.
1. Stuxnet
Starting in 2009, Iran's uranium centrifuges began failing,
and nobody understood why.6 7 Nearly one thousand of Iran's six
thousand centrifuges were destroyed over the course of a year.
68
In the summer of 2010, a computer security firm in Belarus was
hired to troubleshoot Iranian computers that mysteriously kept
crashing-and in this investigation, the firm stumbled upon a
series of files that would later become known as the Stuxnet
virus.6 9 The Stuxnet virus was recognized as the "world's first
digital weapon." 70 It was a complex malware designed to
infiltrate secure Iranian nuclear facilities, infect the industrial
controllers that operated the nuclear centrifuges, and destroy
those centrifuges by manipulating the pressure levels and rotor
speeds inside them.71 The virus was intentionally designed to
cause such havoc slowly and gradually, rendering detection less
likely; it even included a function that manipulated Iranian
sensors to pretend that the manipulated functions were working
as normal.72
Despite the significant attempt to cover its origins, experts
concluded that Stuxnet was a joint United States and Israeli
production.73 Contextual cues, such as the target state and the
66 See Rid & Buchanan, supra note 39, at 21-22.
617 Kim Zetter, How Digital Detectives Deciphered Stuxnet, the Most Menacing
Malware in History, WIRED (July 11, 2011, 7:00 AM),
http://www.wired.com/2011/07/how-digital-detectives-deciphered-stuxnet
[http://perma.cc/D2W7-Y3FQ].
68 Ellen Nakashima & Joby Warrick, Stuxnet was the Work of U.S. and Israeli
Experts, Officials Say, WASH. POST (June 2, 2012),
http://www. washingtonpost. com/world/national-security/stuxnet-was -work-of-
us-and-israeli-experts-officials-say/2012/06/01/gJQAInEy6U story.html
[http://perma.cc/MNY2-6ETP].
69 Zetter, supra note 67.
70 KIM ZETTER, COUNTDOWN TO ZERO DAY: STUXNET AND THE LAUNCH OF THE
WORLD'S FIRST DIGITAL WEAPON (2015).
71 Ralph Langner, To Kill a Centrifuge, LANGNER GROUP 4-12 (Nov. 2013),
http://www.langner.com/en/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/To-kill-a-
centrifuge.pdf [http://perma.cc/8G3X-GR9K].
72 Id. at 9, 15.
73 See, e.g., Nate Anderson, Confirmed: US and Israel Created Stuxnet, Lost
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targeted data or device, often narrows down the list of possible
adversaries. In Stuxnet's case, that information alone was
nearly dispositive, since few states had the motivation and the
means to target Iran's nuclear centrifuges. Furthermore, the
scale of an attack often reveals information about an attacker.
Although advanced persistent threats are some of the most
threatening forms of cyber-attack, their strength also becomes
their weakness, since only a few states would have the
intelligence and resources to develop such a threat. This was
another giveaway from the Stuxnet attack-the fact that the
code had four zero-day exploits74 (which would have been worth
millions to private hackers in terms of its resale value75) again
implied that there was serious firepower behind the attack,
almost guaranteeing that such an attack came from a state.
Finally, small telltale clues can often identify the source of an
attack. Through Stuxnet's code, investigators were able to
discover the main target of its attack based off names and ID
numbers that referenced Siemens devices-the industrial
centrifuge controllers that were the target of manipulation.
76
Given the narrowness of the target, and the immense resources
that went into it, it was easy to deduce the states behind the
attack.
2. Sony Attack
In October 2014, hackers raided the computer network of
Sony Pictures.77 The hackers downloaded nearly the entirety of
Sony Pictures' records, including internal communications,
scripts, and even unreleased movies, and the hackers proceeded
to dump these all online while erasing them from Sony's
computers. 78 This attack affected over three thousand
computers and eight hundred servers,79 and it was famously
Control of It, ARS TECHNICA (June 1, 2012, 3:00 AM),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/06/confirmed-us-israel-created-
stuxnet-lost-control-of-it [http://perma.ce/97ZU-Q3BB]; Nakashima &
Warrick, supra note 68.
74 See ZERO DAYS (Magnolia Pictures 2016). A zero-day exploit is "a cyber attack
exploiting a vulnerability that has not been disclosed publicly." Leyla Bilge &
Tudor Dumitras, Before We Knew It: An Empirical Study of Zero-Day Attacks
in the Real World, CCS '12 PROC. 2012 ACM CONF. COMPUTER & COMM.
SECURITY 1 (Oct. 2012).
75 ZERO DAYS, supra note 74.
76 See id.
77 Andrea Peterson, The Sony Pictures Hack, Explained, WASH. POST (Dec. 18,
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/12/18/the-
sony-pictures-hack-explained [http://perma.cc/94BT-QHJE].
78 Peter Elkind, Inside the Hack of the Century: Part I, FORTUNE (June 25, 2015,
6:00 AM), http://fortune.com/sony-hack-part- 1 [http://perma.cc/MS3P-P76D].
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known for leading to the cancellation of the theatrical release of
The Interview, the comedy film where Seth Rogen and James
Franco assassinate North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.
80
Only twenty-five days after the attack, the FBI attributed it
to North Korea. FBI Director James Comey announced that he
had "very high confidence" that the attack came from North
Korea,81 and NSA Director Michael Rogers similarly said that he
was "confident" that "this was North Korea."8 2 But how exactly
did they reach this conclusion, and reach it with such
confidence? Again, the attribution of the attack was made easier
through context. Although this attack targeted a private actor,
instead of public one (as in the Stuxnet attack), Sony officials
were well aware that The Interview could antagonize North
Korea, whose regime "had been widely blamed for a series of
cyber attacks" in the past.8 3 These reports were confirmed by two
consultants, each of whom had warned Sony executives that
North Korea would likely employ its hackers to wreak havoc.
8 4
The North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs even published a
statement, prior to the film's release, declaring that North Korea
would take a "decisive and merciless countermeasure" if Sony
released the movie.8 5
So North Korea had means and motive.86 There was also
forensic evidence. FBI officials noted similarities to the
DarkSeoul attack, a previous cyber-attack that North Korea
launched against South Korean banks.8 7 They also discovered
[http://perma.cc/7EN6-F6S9].
80 Peterson, supra note 77.
81 Peter Elkind, Inside the Hack of the Century: Part III, FORTUNE (June 27, 2015,
8:00 AM), http://fortune.com/sony-hack-final-part [http://perma.cc/Z4SS-
Z7VR].
82 See Sam Frizell, NSA Director on Sony Hack: 'The Entire World is Watching',
TIME (Jan. 8, 2015), http://time.com/3660757/nsa-michael-rogers-sony-hack
[http://perma.cc/57ZX-AM65].
83 Peter Elkind, Inside the Hack of the Century: Part II, FORTUNE (June 26, 2015,
6:00 AM), http://fortune.com/sony-hack-part-two/ [http://perma.cc/MS3P-
P76D].
84 Id.
85 See Michael Cieply & Brooks Barnes, Sony Cyberattack, First a Nuisance,
Swiftly Grew Into a Firestorm, N.Y. Times (Dec. 30, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/31/business/media/sony-attack-first-a-
nuisance-swiftly-grew-into-a-firestorm-.html [http://perma.cc/B3WL-GDFP].
86 "Means, motive, and opportunity" is a common way of describing some of the
elements of criminal law. See, for example, motive described in relation to
intent by Walter Wheeler Cook, Act, Intention, and Motive in the Criminal
Law, 26 YALE L.J. 645 (1917). For a translation of the phrase "means, motive,
and opportunity" in the context of cyber attacks, see Elizabeth Van Ruitenbeek
et al., Characterizing the Behavior of Cyber Adversaries: The Means, Motive,




87 Elkind, supra note 81.
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evidence that the malware was produced on computers with
Korean language settings.88 Moreover, the data revealed a trail
of internet staging points for the attack that similarly pointed
towards North Korea.89 Finally, the FBI cited intelligence from
"sensitive sources and methods"90-in other words, the United
States had evidence collected from spying on North Korea.91
3. DNC Hack
The DNC hack offers the latest example of a major attack
that has been attributed to a state actor. As in the Sony attack,
the U.S. intelligence community has concluded with "high
confidence" that the DNC hack came from Russia.92 Although
this determination also relied on classified intelligence
information, 93 several private cybersecurity firms were
consulted in the investigation, and offer public evidence tracing
the attack to Russia.94 They noted, for example, that the DNC
hackers used exfiltration tools and coding identical to ones used
by a group of Russian hackers known to work for the Russian
FSB (Russia's successor to the KGB). 95 These analysts also
linked the DNC hack to the same IP address used to conduct an
attack against the German Parliament in 2015. 96 Security
experts noted a signature in Russia's Cyrillic alphabet left
behind as a digital signature.97 And, even more subtly, security
analysts noted that the DNC hackers stopped operations on






91 David E. Sanger & Martin Fackler, N.S.A. Breached North Korea Networks
Before Sony Attack, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/19/world/asia/nsa-tapped-into-north-korean-
networks-before-sony-attack-officials - ay.html [http://perma. cc/P3BB-KABJI.
92 Massimo Calabresi & Pratheen Rebala, Here's the Evidence Russia Hacked the
Democratic National Committee, TIME (Dec. 13, 2016),
http://time.corn/4600177/election-hack-russia-hillary-chnton-donald-trump
[http://perma.ce/4A56-RV82].
93 See id. Later reports revealed that the US had the assistance of Dutch military
intelligence. See Rick Noack, The Dutch Were a Secret U.S. Ally in War Against




94 Noack, supra note 93.
95 Id.
96 Id.
91 See Josh Meyer, Why Experts are Sure Russia Hacked the DNC Emails, NBC
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Of course, such circumstantial evidence is not completely
conclusive,99 and it is possible that some of the information could
have been planted. But systems of law have long been able to
allocate punishment and responsibility, even when
responsibility is derived solely from circumstantial evidence.100
In the case of the DNC hack, while it is possible that someone
planted clues like the Cyrillic signature as a red herring, it is far
less likely that the hacker groups coordinated their operations
entirely within Russian time zones and holidays as part of their
ploy, since such efforts would have high coordination costs and
would require an unusual degree of sophistication. Ultimately,
just as in criminal cases, sufficient evidence can accumulate to
identify the source of an attack.
The problem, then, is not in identifying the source of an
attack. The challenge is in convincing other states that a source
has correctly been identified. A state that wishes to employ
countermeasures needs to convince other states of the accuracy
of its attribution in order to establish the legitimacy of its
attack. 101 This issue may arise for two main reasons: 1)
attribution may be based on data collected through state
espionage or intelligence-gathering efforts that states may wish
to keep secret; 102 and 2) when states have plausible factual bases
for attributing an attack, they may not want to disclose such
evidence, since cyber-attackers could learn from those mistakes
and avoid leaving the same fingerprints in the future. 
103
99 One author, for example, acknowledges that the evidence that Russia was
involved in the hack was good, but comments that "'good' doesn't necessarily
mean good enough to indict Russia's head of state for sabotaging our
democracy." See Sam Biddle, Here's the Public Evidence Russia Hacked the
DNC It's Not Enough, INTERCEPT (Dec. 14, 2016, 11:30 AM),
http://theintercept.com/2016/12/14/heres-the-public-evidence-russia-hacked-
the-dnc-its-not-enough [http://perma.cc/KF4Y-D5YP]. The question of when
such evidence is "good enough" to indict a state is precisely the kind of legal
dispute that a law of attribution is needed to resolve.
100 See, e.g., People v. Benzinger, 36 N.Y.2d 29, 31-32 (1974); People v. Cleague,
22 N.Y.2d 363, 367 (1968); M. Alex Johnson, 'Circumstantial' The Scarlet C?,
NBC NEWS, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/3340617/ns/us news-
crime and courts/t/circumstantial-scarlet-c/#.UkHZcSqF9rc
[http://perma.cc/6JEB-4HFP].
101 While countermeasures themselves might be covert, the presumption is that
even a covert act ought to be legally justifiable, since the attribution of a
countermeasure is always a significant risk, given the discussion of attribution
earlier.
102 See, e.g., Sanger & Fackler, supra note 91; see also Noack, supra note 93.
103 See Rid & Buchanan, supra note 39, at 33 ("Attackers learn from publicised
mistakes."). But see id. at 28 ("Making more details public enables better
collective defenses. When a case and its details are made public, the quality of
attribution is likely to increase. Perhaps the most impressive example is the
multi-layered and highly innovative collective analysis of the Stuxnet code:
various companies and research institutes analysed the malware and produced
a range of highly detailed reports focused on different aspects of the operation."
(emphasis in original)).
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While these efforts were ultimately based on an
accumulation of circumstantial evidence, circumstantial
evidence provides a sufficient degree of confidence to support
legal judgments in many areas of law. 104 After all, the question
of attribution is largely about identifying the actor responsible
for an attack, and responsibility (and what defines
responsibility) is a question that is well within the domain of
law. It is also one that the law has addressed on a number of
occasions, even in contexts that attenuate or obfuscate the link
between the actor and the harm. In torts, for instance, the
doctrines of strict liability and res ipsa loquitur demonstrate
that the dispositive question may not always be who committed
an act (a question often already answered through context) but
rather how we hold a particular person or entity accountable.
10 5
And the use of different liability standards in different contexts
reflects the law's flexibility in creating appropriate frameworks
to resolve such conflicts. 106 When designing our law of
attribution, then, these concerns will involve some inquiry into
the general standards of proof and causation invoked in other
areas of law, where courts have employed legal tools to establish
a sufficient degree of confidence to assign responsibility to an
actor.
II. THE LAW OF ATTRIBUTION
How does one begin to imagine a system of rules and
procedures-a system of law-from the ground up? Fortunately,
prior systems of law and procedure provide abundant material
to draw upon, presenting numerous institutional features and
designs to consider in outlining such a structure. An
international law of attribution must address several questions
when designing its structure and parts. This Part will first
address whether a trans-substantive set of rules for attribution
is possible, and the related question of the ends for which this
law of attribution will be used. These answers lay the foundation
for the system's overall structure and framework, which will
address design choices such as whether to preference an
adversarial model over an inquisitorial system, and other key
aspects of institutional design. This Part will then discuss the
key procedural rules that would define the boundaries of
substantive law. These rules include the burden of proof, the
standard for assessing state responsibility for the behavior of
non-state actors, and rules for evidence and managing sensitive
104 See supra note 100.
105 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
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intelligence that might be produced to support a claim of
attribution. While procedural in nature, such rules have
tremendous influence over the potential outcome of cases, and
an appropriate process must be developed to ensure that the
process of law bears an appropriate and reasoned relationship to
the substance of the law-the glue that binds the process of law
to its legitimacy.
A. A Trans-Substantive Law of
Attribution
First: is it possible to develop a trans-substantive law of
attribution whose rules will apply regardless of the legal or
political action justified by the attribution? Put another way, are
the procedural rules and requirements for attribution
contingent upon the subsequent legal sanction that might be
imposed on those who are attributed with causing a cyber-
attack? One can easily imagine, for instance, that laws for
attribution could change their standards of strictness or
flexibility based on the severity of the sanction imposed upon the
state against whom an attack is attributed. To answer the
question of trans-substantivity, one might first conceive of the
various possible legal sanctions, and consider whether or not
those conditions alone are sufficient to change what we think the
procedural rules or process for attribution should be.
Speaking broadly, there may be several purposes behind a
law of attribution-several types of subsequent sanctions or
responses that might be justified by a legal claim of attribution.
First, after attributing an attack, negative economic punishment
could be placed upon the state responsible for the cyber-attack,
such as that of an economic sanction. Second, a state attributed
with launching an attack could be denied positive benefits,
through denying it participation in future international treaties
or agreements. Third, attribution could justify a hack-back
countermeasure.10 7 Fourth, attribution could justify a military
response. These possible responses to attribution might further
be divided along two categories: unilateral action or multilateral
action.
107 See, e.g., Corey T. Holzer & James E. Lerums, The Ethics of Hacking Back,
IEEE (2016); Vikas Jayaswal, William Yurcik & David Doss, Internet Hack
Back: Counter Attacks as Self-Defense or Vigilantism?, IEEE 380 (2002);
Michael Poznansky & Evan Perkoski, Did the U.S. 'Hack Back' at Russia?
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Unilateral Multilateral
Denial of Diplomatic Refusal to engage Denial of
Access/Agreements in trade agreement, membership in
treaty, or other bi- broader trade








Cyber "Hack-Back" Jointly produced
Countermeasure cyber strikes, e.g.,
Stuxnet
108
Military Military invasion; Coalition-based






While these options present a host of practical and policy
responses that states might pursue after an attributed cyber-
attack, for the purposes of creating rules of attribution, these
responses can be considered along two main axes of salience
when it comes to their influence on how we design our rules of
attribution: 1) whether the action is unilateral or multilateral,
and 2) how "serious" the punishment is.
The first question-whether attribution is used to launch a
unilateral or multilateral response-actually has a fairly narrow
effect on the overall theory for a law of attribution. This is
largely because the purpose behind a law of attribution is
generally consistent across both unilateral and multilateral
responses-attribution justifies a punishment in the eyes of the
international community. Whether or not a state wishes to
punish a cyber-aggressor with its own unilateral action or the
action of a multilateral coalition, attribution seeks to legitimize
that behavior in the eyes of third parties in the international
community.
The one exception is in cases where multilateral commitment
is not guaranteed, and an aggrieved state needs to convince
others not only that retribution is justified, but also that other
states ought to participate in the retribution. These cases may
tilt the theory of a law of attribution towards more stringent
requirements, since other states might demand higher
108 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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confidence in attribution before committing their own resources
to responding to a cyber-attack that did not afflict them directly.
As a result, there may be a confidence gap between the directly
aggrieved state and states that might participate in the
multilateral response.
There are two responses to the confidence gap concern: 1)
states who suffer the attack directly have an extremely high
interest in correctly identifying the source of the attack (to
maintain credibility, to ensure signal deterrence capabilities for
future attacks, etc.), meaning that the confidence gap may
depend less on the certainty of attribution and more on the
general incentives that states have for joining multilateral
action, 10 9 and 2) the mere existence of a multilateral institution
that commits non-victim states to respond seems to suggest that
the source of that institutional connection may itself suffice to
cause those states to join in imposing punishment without the
extra assurance of a stricter attribution regime.110 For example,
if states were bound to multilateral responses to a cyber-attack
(for example, by treaty), then the fact of their being bound-as a
matter of law, or as a matter of rational interest in securing
future cooperation-might be enough to justify a state's decision
to join the aggrieved state in issuing a multilateral response to
an attributed source of cyber-attack. Consider the techniques
that the United States employed to gather a coalition of states
to participate in the Iraq War in 2003. 111 As a result, the
unilateral/multilateral distinction likely will not alter the
possibility of a trans-substantive set of rules for attribution.
The severity of possible countermeasures to a cyber-attack
may more seriously threaten the idea of a single trans-
substantive law of attribution. More serious countermeasures
may demand more stringent procedural rules, causing such
rules to depend upon the countermeasure that a state shall
pursue.112 While this intuitive principle may seem true in the
109 This assumes, however, that states behave rationally. If states are risk-averse,
and transactional and information costs makes states generally less inclined
to punish cyber-aggressors compared to states that directly suffer an attack,
then the law of attribution might account for this by adjusting rules of
procedure to allow coalition parties (states that are bound to a multilateral
response to cyber-aggression) to join a proceeding, which in turn may allow
such states to receive access to evidence that might otherwise be under seal to
other third-parties. See discussion infra Section II.A.4.
110 See, e.g., North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S.
243.
111 See, e.g., ANDREW JOSEPH LOOMIS, LEVERAGING LEGITIMACY IN SECURING U.S.
LEADERSHIP: NORMATIVE DIMENSIONS OF HEGEMONIC AUTHORITY 202 (2008);
Barbara Slavin, U.S. Builds War Coalition with Favors and Money, USA
TODAY, Feb. 25, 2003, at A01.
112 See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (considering the private
interest as one of the three key prongs in assessing the appropriate level of
procedural due process); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) ("Though
deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding, it visits a great hardship
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abstract, it is worth exploring in the specific context of cyber-
security and the possible state responses detailed above.
Organizing the possible countermeasures by the seriousness of
their magnitude, responses can be roughly ordered as follows
(from highest magnitude to lowest): military force, cyber
countermeasures (or "hack-back" protocols), economic sanctions,
and diplomatic punishments.
While military force covers a wide range of possible actions
(from a full-scale military campaign to limited strikes and
special operations), these actions nonetheless can be categorized
as the most severe possible countermeasure in response to a
cyber-attack. Given the general costs of military action and the
danger of escalation, 113 military force is an increasingly rare
option pursued by states. 114 Moreover, international law
expressly places a general prohibition on the use of force. 5
Nevertheless, both politicians and military leaders have
postured towards the possibility of military responses to foreign
cyber-attacks,116 leaving the option on the table when it comes
to possible countermeasures against hacking, especially if the
cyber-attack is serious enough to rise to the level of being
classified as an act of force. 117 The specter of military action
would likely trigger tremendous scrutiny from the international
community, and an exceedingly high bar of confidence to
properly attribute the source of a cyber-attack. This is especially
true given the infamy attached to the invasion of Iraq in 2003,
which the United States initiated on the false assertion that Iraq
on the individual and deprives him of the right to stay and live and work in
this land of freedom. That deportation is a penalty-at times a most serious
one-cannot be doubted. Meticulous care must be exercised lest the procedure
by which he is deprived of that liberty not meet the essential standards of
fairness.").
113 See Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power, 80 FOREIGN POL'Y 153, 157-58 (1990).
114 See, e.g., Ther~se Pettersson & Peter Wallensteen, Armed Conflicts, 1946-2014,
52 J. PEACE RES. 536 (2016); Joshua S. Goldstein & Steven Pinker, The Decline
of War and Violence, Bos. GLOBE (Apr. 15, 2016),
http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2016/04/15/the-dechne-war-and-
violence/lxhtEplvppt0Bz9kPphzkL/story.html [http://perma.cc/9T9J-ZB6M].
115 See U.N. Charter art. 2, 4.
116 See DEP'T OF DEF., CYBERSPACE POLICY REPORT: A REPORT TO CONGRESS
PURSUANT TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR
2011, SECTION 934, at 2 (2011); Katie Bo Williams, Clinton: Treat Cyber Attacks
'Like Any Other Attack', HILL (Aug. 31, 2016, 1:47 PM),
http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/293970-clinton-treat-cyberattacks-like-
any-other-attack [http://perma.cc/L4JU-4JZK]; Patrick Howell O'Neill, U.S.
Military and NATO Agree: Cyberattacks Could Trigger Real War, DAILY DOT
(June 22, 2016, 10:22 AM), http://www.dailydot.com/layer8/dod-nato-cyber-
attack-response [http://perma.cc/HC4K-6ZQW].
1 See Hathaway et al., supra note 13; Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network
Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative
Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNATL L. 885, 909 (1999); Daniel B. Silver,
Computer Network Attack as a Use of Force Under Article 2(4) of the United
Nations Charter, 76 COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK & INT'L L. 73, 85-92 (2002).
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possessed weapons of mass destruction. 118
Another category of countermeasure, the cyber "hack-
back," 119 might also rise to the level of seriousness linked to the
use of military force. While cyber "hack-backs" may cover a
potentially broader array of activities than those of military
force, several scholars have suggested that cyber-attacks have
the potential to cause as much damage as traditional, kinetic
military attacks, sometimes qualifying as force that falls under
the international law of war. 120 To the extent that cyber hack-
backs are considered the international equivalent of military
force, then such countermeasures might also demand a
particular set of procedural rules to justify an attribution in
those high stakes contexts.
Does the need for stricter procedural rules with more serious
countermeasures doom the project of creating a trans-
substantive law of attribution? Not at all. Laws can account for
punishments of differing degrees of severity by simply modifying
relevant procedural rules or requirements to trigger particular
punishments. Consider, for example, U.S. copyright law, which
contains provisions that can impose civil damages, enhanced
civil damages, or criminal liability based on the severity of
predicate acts of copyright infringement. 121 All three
punishments for infringement attach to the same general
system of copyright law, but the particular punishment turns on
the defendant's mens rea. "Willful" infringement can earn
enhanced statutory damages, while "purposeful" infringement
may create criminal liability. 122 Thus, higher levels of penalty
can still attach to the same framework of law, even if the higher
penalty deserves consideration of some higher standard of proof.
The relevant question, then, is whether or not that difference in
penalty can have its corresponding effect on procedural rules
confined to a single category of rule.
In the context of attribution, the same adjustment of law can
account for differences in punishment subsequent to the
attribution of an attack to a particular state. It is true that state-
to-state adjudication may care less about the particular mens rea
involved since mens rea focuses on individual mindsets and
states are composed of a multitude of individuals, making a
state's mens rea a legal fiction. Nonetheless, a law of attribution
can adjust its standards of scrutiny based on the burden of proof
118 See Martin Chulov & Helen Pidd, Defector Admits to WMD Lies that Triggered
Iraq War, GUARDIAN (Feb. 15, 2011, 7:58 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/15/defector-admits-wmd-lies-
iraq-war [http://perma.cc/W46Q-YZ2S].
119 See supra note 107.
120 See Hathaway et al., supra note 13; David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the
Law of War, 4 J. NATL SECURITY L. & POL'Y 87 (2010).
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it requires. The standards for burden of proof, like mens rea, are
a core element of procedure that can be notched higher or lower
based on the severity of the chosen remedy.123 If anything, the
mens rea requirement is merely one particular means of fine-
tuning the burden of proof, and the evidentiary standard of proof
presents another holistic way to incorporate the seriousness of a
penalty into the generalized requirements of a procedural
framework.
Given the possibility of creating a trans-substantive law of
attribution, the next step is to begin outlining the main features
and characteristics of such a system, beginning with the
foundational elements that will shape the structure of the
overall law.
1. Adversarial or Civil System
One main design choice asks whether a law of attribution
would operate under an adversarial framework, as typified by
the American and British legal systems, or under an
inquisitorial framework, 124 as typified by most of the European,
Asian, and South American countries' legal institutions. 125 The
choice between an adversarial or inquisitorial framework is
largely reflective of a philosophy of legal process that then
shapes the rules and overall design of the system. An adversarial
legal framework is primarily characterized as a system where
impartial decision makers (judges or juries) issue judgments on
disputes based on evidence and arguments presented by the
parties (and their legal representatives). 126 This system relies on
123 The exact burden of proof sufficient to justify the potential sanctions that
states might impose is discussed infra Section II.A.2.
124 See, e.g., Franklin Strier, What Can the American Adversary System Learn
from an Inquisitorial System of Justice?, 76 JUDICATURE 109 (1992-1993)
(describing the differences between an adversarial and inquisitorial system of
justice).
125 See Alphabetical Index of the 192 United Nations Member States and
Corresponding Legal Systems, JURIGLOBE, http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/syst-
onu/index-alpha.php [http://perma.cc/7ANM-VUB4]. The inquisitorial system
is also sometimes referred to as the "continental system." See generally Hein
K6tz, Civil Justice Systems in Europe and the United States, 13 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT'L L. 61 (2003) (commenting on similarities and differences between the
two systems, particularly the German and American systems); John H.
Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823
(1985) (same). These systems have also been referred to as "nonadversarial
systems." See, e.g., Edward A. Tomlinson, Nonadversarial Justice: The French
Experience, 42 MD. L. REV. 131 (1983). Though the label "inquisitorial" is
subject to some controversy, see K6tz, supra, at 66 (describing the labels
"inquisitorial" as "misleading because it conjures up the Spanish Inquisition,
Kafka's castle, and bureaucratic omnipotence"), the suggested connotations of
the term "inquisitorial" do not seem to reflect the contemporary understanding
of inquisitorial legal systems.
126 See Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An
2018
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the production of evidence and arguments by the adversarial
parties themselves. An inquisitorial framework, meanwhile,
positions the judge as the primary fact-finder and investigator,
and the parties and their attorneys play a far more limited role
in gathering evidence. 127
While many inquisitorial systems still retain a number of
"adversarial" features,128 the shift in emphasis from the parties
to the judge has a key ripple effect on the overall legal system. 129
As John Langbein notes, the German courts' inquisitorial design
significantly shapes the rest of Germany's civil procedure. For
example, Langbein points out that the inquisitorial system
produces a much more flexible sequence for the various stages of
litigation. Whereas an adversarial model maintains set
sequences for plaintiff and defendant presentation or
participation in various parts of the litigation, "in German
procedure the court ranges over the entire case, constantly
looking for the jugular-for the issue of law or fact that might
dispose of the case." 130 Consequently, the inquisitorial system,
at least in Germany, has an "episodic character," where the
flexibility of inquisitorial processes allow a continuous trial
process that allows rehearing of issues through multiple points
in time. 131 Additionally, Langbein notes that the inquisitorial
structure significantly impacts the use of witnesses and the role
they play in producing facts or evidence before the court. In the
adversarial system, the parties are largely responsible for
supplying the witnesses, preparing the witnesses, and direct-
and cross-examining the witnesses. 132 Within the inquisitorial
system, meanwhile, the judge manages the tasks of summoning
witnesses and directing their examination in court. 133 These are
but two examples of the larger effects that an adversarial or
inquisitorial system may have in influencing the overall
character of a legal institution's civil procedure. Consequently,
when constructing a law of attribution, this feature of legal
design should be one determined at the outset.
Arguments can be mustered in favor of either system.
Advocates of the adversarial system extol the virtues of
Economic Perspective, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 413 (1997).
127 See Langbein, supra note 125, at 824.
128 Id.; see also K6tz, supra note 125, at 66-67 (describing similarities between the
two systems).
129 See generally Langbein, supra note 125 (describing the differences that the
German inquisitorial system has on the substantiation of a complaint, judicial
case management, discovery, solicitation and examination of witnesses, and
expert testimony).
130 Id. at 830.
131 Id. at 831.
132 See Martin Marcus, Above the Fray or Into the Breach: The Judge's Role in New
York's Adversarial System of Criminal Justice, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 1193, 1194
(1992).
133 Id. at 828, 837.
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adversarial cross-examination as the most robust tool for
exposing falsehoods;134 point to potential efficiency in a system
whereby parties specialize in presenting and securing evidence
and fact-finders specialize in drawing inferences from given
evidence; 135 and point to the possibility that a inquisitorial judge
may prejudge the outcome of a case, omitting crucial evidence or
arguments that might shed further light on the dispute. 136
Advocates of the inquisitorial system point to the possibility that
the excessive partisanship and showmanship that shades into
an adversarial process may end up distorting the facts and
evidence137 and tilting the system into one that favors those with
more resources and better counsel. 138 Amongst all this back and
forth, scholars have employed a number of theoretical and
empirical models to test the efficacy of both systems. Some
mathematical models suggest that there is little difference
between either system's capacity to produce accurate or ideal
outcomes, 139 while other models or studies say that the outcome
depends on the particular data that an individual is
measuring.140 While the debate between models of legal design
has long raged on, and will likely see no resolution in the near
future, it is no controversial claim to suggest that perhaps each
model may operate better in different contexts. Consider
134 See JOHN H. WIGMORE, 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1367, at 32 (Chadbourn rev.
ed., Little, Brown 1974).
135 Jeffrey S. Parker, Daubert's Debut: The Supreme Court, the Economics of
Scientific Evidence, and the Adversarial System, 4 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 12-
13 (1995).
136 See Kttz, supra note 125, at 65. But see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble
with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 5 (1996) (suggesting that even a binary oppositional system does
not present a sufficiently high number of viewpoints to capture the nuances of
truth).
137 See JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTHS AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE
86 (1949); Ktitz, supra note 125, at 65; Langbein, supra note 125, at 833.
138 See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts
the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953 (2000); Russell G. Pearce, Redressing
Inequality in the Market for Justice: Why Access to Lawyers Will Never Solve
the Problem and Why Rethinking the Role of Judges Will Help, 73 FORDHAM L.
REV. 969 (2004).
139 See Luke M. Froeb & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Evidence Production in Adversarial
vs. Inquisitorial Regimes, 70 ECON. LETTERS 267 (2001).
140 See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE 27-30 (1988) (reviewing studies that favored the adversarial system
based on subjects' perceived "ratings of procedural fairness and satisfaction");
Francesco Parisi, Rent-Seeking Through Litigation: Adversarial and
Inquisitorial Systems Compared, 22 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 193 (2002)
(concluding that the adversarial system's costs are more apparent when
evaluating each system through the lens of the Nash Equilibrium and
considering litigation expenditure); Blair H. Sheppard & Neil Vidmar,
Adversary Pretrial Procedures and Testimonial Evidence: Effect of Lawyer's
Role and Machiavellianism, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 320 (1980)
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Langbein, who, despite favoring the general efficacy of
inquisitorial systems, acknowledges that the adversarial system
may merit unique justifications in the criminal law context. 
141
I suggest that the adversarial model is more uniquely suited
to the context of attribution. I favor the adversarial model
because the advantages of inquisitorial legal systems are
nullified by the international setting. First, inquisitorial
systems depend upon a preexisting, centralized judicial
authority that can be trusted to objectively seek the truth, and
the international realm lacks any such institution. Second,
because attribution frequently relies on technical evidence, and
evidence is often acquired through espionage or other covert
intelligence gathering, the parties themselves will almost
always be in the best position to acquire and present such
evidence in attribution disputes.
The inquisitorial system's dependence upon the judiciary to
drive its procedure is largely a weakness in the international
context. While a number of international courts do exist, these
courts have incomplete jurisdiction or are dedicated to
specialized subject matter that fails to cover the attribution
question presented here. 142 The International Court of Justice
(ICJ) is the best possible preexisting judicial option in the
current international framework, given its generally broad
consideration of subject matter.143 However, even the ICJ has
limited reach; the ICJ can settle disputes between states only to
the extent that states consent to its use. 144 Following the court's
ruling against the United States in Nicaragua v. United
States, 145 for example, the United States withdrew from the
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. 146 Moreover, the enforcement
powers of the ICJ are limited by the fact that enforcement is
carried out through the Security Council, which allows members
of the Security Council to thwart enforcement of its rulings, as
the United States did in Nicaragua.147 Since the inquisitorial
system's emphasis on the managerial judge presumes a
heightened degree of trust in the legitimacy of the institutional
141 See Langbein, supra note 125, at 842.
142 Because this Note is concerned with state-to-state disputes, courts like the
International Criminal Court, for instance, provide no answer because their
jurisdiction is solely limited to prosecuting individuals for their conduct under
international law.
143 See HUGH THIRLWAY, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 27 (2016).
144 Id.
145 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14 [hereinafter Nicaragua].
146 See Paul W. Kahn, From Nuremberg to The Hague: The United States Position
in Nicaragua v. United States and the Development of International Law, 12
YALE J. INTL L. 1, 2 (1987).
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judiciary that directs much of its proceedings, the political
nature of these international claims may make states less likely
to participate in a process driven more by courts than by the
parties themselves.
Second, the inquisitorial system presumes that the judges
have enough expertise to seek out the relevant information that
will resolve a case. Such expertise includes knowing which
(expert) witnesses to seek and how to conduct their examination.
But in the context of attribution, this presumption of competency
may not hold. Given the technical nature of cyber-attacks and
attribution, parties may justifiably view a generalized court as
less reliable in taking the lead on the production of facts and
evidence. Even if this concern could be addressed by conducting
its proceedings under a panel of judges with technical
expertise,148 such judges would still fall short when it comes to
their relative position in ascertaining the precise facts at issue
in a particular dispute. A judge might not have as much
familiarity with each state's cyber capabilities and operations,
nor with the underlying evidence that might support one state's
allegations that another was responsible for a cyber-attack.
Since much of the evidence surrounding cyber-attacks and
cyber-security might also be derived from covert intelligence
operations, 149 the adversarial system would be more appropriate
since the parties themselves are best positioned to present or
decide when to present certain sensitive evidence. 
150
The choice of an adversarial system for the attribution
framework sets up a general picture of what the law of
attribution might look like. Such a system would have an
impartial adjudicator, 151 and would largely be driven by the
parties in terms of both legal argumentation and the production
148 The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, for instance, is known for specializing in
technical matters, given the fact that it has nearly exclusive jurisdiction over
patent appeals in the United States. See Court Jurisdiction, FED. CIR.,
http://www. cafc. uscourts .gov/the-court/court-jurisdiction
[http://perma.cc/89JS-WNWA].
149 See, e.g., Sanger & Fackler, supra note 91; Sam Biddle, Top-Secret Snowden
Document Reveals What the NSA Knew About Previous Russian Hacking,
INTERCEPT (Dec. 29, 2016, 10:26 AM), http://theintercept.com/2016/12/29/top-
secret -snowden-document -reveals-what-the-nsa-knew-about -previous-
russian-hacking [http://perma.cc/NE65-WJ3B]; Kate Connolly, German Spy
Chief Says Russian Hackers Could Disrupt Elections, GUARDIAN (Nov. 29, 2016,
10:34 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/29/german-spy-chief-
russian-hackers -could-disrupt -elections -bruno-kahl-cyber-attacks
[http://perma.cc/N5EM-3GVC]; Shane Harris, U.S. Spies Say They Tracked
'Sony Hackers' for Years, DAILY BEAST (Jan. 2, 2015, 6:55 PM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/01/02/u-s-spies-say-they-tracked-
sony-hackers-for-years.html [http://perma.cc/X8G8-RJAW].
150 For an economic analysis of how the burden of production might be optimized
in an adversarial system, see generally Hay & Spier, supra note 126.
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of facts and evidence. Consequently, such a system would
contain a procedural sequencing similar to that of the American
legal system, from initiation to discovery to the presentation of
arguments, where arguments are structured around the parties'
respective phases of argumentation.
2. Standard of Proof
With an adversarial framework in place, the next part of the
picture to fill in is establishing how the adversarial parties
would succeed in proving their claim of attribution-in other
words, to set the burden of proof for successfully proving a claim.
The term "burden of proof' generally refers to two distinct
concepts: the burden of persuasion and the burden of production
(of evidence). 152 Since much of the Section above addresses the
burden of production being placed on the parties in an
adversarial setting, the term "burden of proof," as used here,
refers to the burden of persuasion. Broadly speaking, the burden
of persuasion concerns the confidence a trier of fact should have
in coming to a legal conclusion after receiving all of the relevant
facts and arguments presented by a case.
153
The burden of proof is perhaps the most significant
procedural rule that has bearing on the substantive outcome of
a case. Robert Belton describes the burden of proof as "one of the
most important procedural notions in our legal system" since "it
helps implement the substantive laws by instructing the
factfinder on the degree of confidence he should have in the
correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of case." 
154
After all, the same set of facts may lead to entirely different
outcomes based on the burden the parties have to prove their
case. 15
5
152 See James Fleming, Jr., Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. REV. 51, 51 (1961); see also
JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON
LAW 355-59 (1898).
153 Fleming, supra note 152, at 52.
154 Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward
a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1207 (1981).
155 Consider the raised pleading standard established in Jqbal v. Ashcroft, 556
U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), which
Arthur Miller criticized as collapsing the distinction between summary
judgment and the motion to dismiss phase (heightening the latter to the level
of the former, which in effect forced the former standard to heighten in order
to distinguish itself from the latter). See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to
Twombly to Jqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60
DUKE L.J. 1, 15, 18 (2010). Although the pleading standard occupies a different
context from the merits phase of meeting a burden of proof, pleading standards
entail their own burdens of proof for a case to proceed, which is the precise
issue attracting controversy around the rulings in Twombly and Jqbal.
Empirical studies to date have determined that the heightened pleading
standard established bylqbal and Twombly have had a statistically significant
effect on diminishing plaintiffs' access to the courts. See Theodore Eisenberg &
34
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Some scholars have criticized the gradations between
burdens of proof as having no clear or meaningful distinctions in
the minds of a judge or jury. 156 However, these criticisms have
been raised on a theoretical level; often, the empirical evidence
mustered in support of these arguments have been based on
surveys asking individuals to define or assign a probability value
to various burdens of proof in the abstract. 157 But answers to
surveys on the meaning of these burdens of proof may not be
conclusive because the meaning of such terms are always
understood in practice in relation to specific sets of facts. 158
Thus, a lack of consensus on the particular meaning of "clear and
convincing" may not reflect factfinders' actual agreement as it
pertains to a particular case, where a given set of factfinders
may all agree that a party's evidence has established "clear and
convincing" evidence. Furthermore, these theoretical arguments
dismissing the role of the standards of proof seem unpersuasive
when considering the empirical effect that the burdens of proof
have had on the outcomes of cases in practice. 159 Given the
significant weight that the burden of proof has on a legal
Kevin M. Clermont, Essay, Plaintiphobia in the Supreme Court, 100 CORNELL
L. REV. 193, 209 n.53 (2014) (analyzing over 18,000 cases to find a 14% increase
in a defendant's chance of winning pre-trial adjudication post-Twombly, and a
36% increase in the case of pro se plaintiffs); Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao
of Pleading: Do Twombly and JqbalMatter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553,
556 (2010) (finding that after Twombly, the number of 12(b) motions to dismiss
granted increased from 46% to 48%, and that after Jqbal, granted 12(b) motions
rose to 56%); Joseph A. Seiner, Pleading Disability, 51 B.C. L. REV. 95, 118
(2010) (noting that dismissals increased from 54.2% to 64.6% in disability cases
after Twombly).
156 See C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence,
or Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293 (1982). In fact, some
studies suggest hat burdens of persuasion may have the opposite effect-that
the standard way of explaining the burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt,
in fact, may lead juries to be more likely to convict in criminal cases than in
civil ones. See Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal
Cases: Some Doubt About Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEx. L. REV. 105 (1999).
157 See McCauliff, supra note 156.
158 See Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof 121 YALE L.J. 738, 809 (2012) ("Answers to
surveys on the meaning of 'more likely than not' may convey little, for the
suggestion here is that its meaning in practice can depend very much on the
circumstances."); Erik Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory
and the Virtues of Variability, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 146-83 (2002)
(suggesting that the variability of jury understanding of "reasonable doubt"
may be an appropriate response to the particular types of cases observed by
the jury).
159 See Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical
Research on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 622 (2000)
(observing in a literature review that five studies demonstrated that "the
wording used to convey the standard of proof has a substantial impact on jury
verdicts"); Ashley Provencher, Josh Gupta-Kagan & Mary Eschelbach Hansen,
The Standard of Proof at Adjudication of Abuse or Neglect: Its Influence on
Case Outcomes at Key Junctures, 17 SOC. WORK & SOC. Sci. REV. 22 (2014);
supra note 155.
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system's proceedings, it is important to decide the appropriate
height for the burden of proof under the law of attribution.
There are three classic standards used for the burden of
proof: proving a case by the preponderance of the evidence,
proving a case by clear and convincing evidence, and proving a
case beyond a reasonable doubt. 160 A "preponderance of the
evidence" standard straightforwardly requires that a factfinder
believes the existence of the fact (or legal outcome) to be more
likely than its nonexistence, 161 roughly allocating the burdens of
proof equally across both parties. 162 A "clear and convincing
evidence" standard is described by the Supreme Court as an
"intermediate standard," that imposes somewhat higher
requirements for persuasion than that of preponderance of the
evidence, though still a level of persuasion short of that reserved
for those beyond a reasonable doubt.16 3 Finally, the standard of
"beyond a reasonable doubt" represents the highest burden of
proof, meant to ensure the highest possible protection for the
defendant against the possibility of an erroneous judgment.
16 4
Although this spectrum for burdens of proof is well
established, the normative underpinnings for when each
standard ought to apply is much less clear. James Fleming wrote
that "It]here is no satisfactory test for allocating the burden of
proof in either sense on any given Issue." 1G5 Robert Belton echoed
similar sentiments, noting that "the courts have not yet
developed any universal rule or set of policy considerations for
courts to rely on in determining how the three burdens should
be allocated between the parties." 166 It is true that the
preponderance standard has long been the standard for civil
proceedings in the United States, and reasonable doubt has
likewise been the principal rule for American criminal justice
proceedings. 167 However, these standards have become
associated with their respective proceedings mostly as a matter
of tradition, lacking particularized justification, particularly for
the standard used in civil proceedings.16 8 This is especially clear
when contrasting the United States' legal system to those of
other countries. A number of countries with inquisitorial
traditions, such as Germany, apply the reasonable-doubt
standard to all legal questions that their courts confront, no
160 See J.P. MeBaine, Burden of Proof Degrees of Belief, 32 CAL. L. REV. 242, 245
(1944).
161 See Belton, supra note 154, at 1220.
162 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979).
163 Id. at 424.
164 Id.
165 Fleming, supra note 152, at 58.
166 Belton, supra note 154, at 1217.
167 See id. at 1220, 1282; Kaplow, supra note 158, at 742.
168 See Kaplow, supra note 158, at 742.
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matter the subject matter.16 9 So, different burdens of proof can
most certainly be employed for any one particular legal system.
In the case of attribution, how does one choose which burden of
proof to apply?
While there may be no single test for choosing a standard for
the burden of proof, there are general principles that do shape
this selection. As Belton notes, "Many different burden
allocation tests have emerged from the cases and literature, but
there is little consensus on a favored approach. All the tests,
however, are grounded in considerations such as policy
rationales, fairness, and the probability that the event in
question actually occurred." 170 Fleming also concludes that
similar overarching principles of fairness, convenience, and
policy drive the decisions setting a standard for burdens of
proof. 171 Besides these more general principles, Fleming
acknowledges the relevance of other considerations, such as a
party's relative access to evidence, the extent to which a party's
contention departs from ordinary human experience, and
substantive considerations that might employ the burdens of
proof as handicaps against disfavored contentions.172
While Belton and Fleming's descriptions seem
conventionally true, they also do not provide much helpful
insight. Fairness, convenience, and policy, as broad
justifications, could apply to almost any legal construction, and
in any direction. The more specific considerations that they
proffer provide a step in the right direction. Even then, the
confluence of multiple considerations risks turning the endeavor
into a multi-factor marionette: one that can be pulled in any
particular manner based on the puppeteer and the string that
they wish to pull.
Instead, Louis Kaplow places these considerations along a
more concrete frame of reference, approaching the burdens of
proof with an economic analysis of how each burden of proof
might best accomplish the legal system's goals. 173 The burden of
proof is specifically seen as a tool for adjusting two main
probabilistic outcomes: the probability of imposing liability on
someone who conducted harmful behavior, and the probability
of imposing erroneous liability on someone behaving benignly or
productively. 174 For Kaplow, the burden of proof must walk the
tightrope balance between deterring harmful acts and avoiding
the chilling of productive ones.175 In this line of thought, it is
169 See Kevin M. Clermont & Emily Sherwin, A Comparative View of Standards
of Proof, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 243, 245 (2002).
170 Belton, supra note 154, at 1217-18.
171 Fleming, supra note 152, at 60.
172 Id. at 58-61.
173 See Kaplow, supra note 158.
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essential to consider asymmetric error costs, 176 since these error
calculations often dictate how our procedural rules tilt the
playing field, including the way we set our burdens of proof.
The classic example is that of criminal punishment-because
it is "better to let ten guilty persons go free than to convict one
innocent person," we justify "many defendant-favoring rules of
criminal procedure," including a high burden of proof. 177 For
attribution, the error costs seem less clearly skewed towards one
side or the other. Is it better to let a cyber-attacking state go free
than to punish one innocent state? Assuming that the cyber-
attack is serious enough to rise to the level of armed force, 178 and
assuming the range of countermeasures short of a military
strike, 179 it is not necessarily clear whether the harm of a cyber-
attack is less serious than a military strike, especially if the
latter is supposed to be constrained by rules of proportionality. 180
For a law of attribution, the preponderance of the evidence
is most suitable to achieve the overall aims for a system of
attribution. In cases where military action is the only (or
threatened) response to a cyber-attack, the burden of proof
should ratchet up to the reasonable doubt standard. As a
baseline burden of proof, demonstrating attribution by a
preponderance of the evidence seems most appropriate for two
main reasons. First, a lower burden of proof produces a lower
evidence threshold that increases the chance of producing legal
judgment, thereby increasing the risk of liability and promoting
the deterrence of harmful behavior. Second, it allocates the
burden of persuasion roughly equally among parties,
challenging both parties to optimally produce information and
evidence regarding the origins of a cyber-attack.
176 See Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review, 114 MICH. L.
REV. 1355, 1395-96 (2016); see also David H. Kaye, Statistical Significance and
the Burden of Persuasion, 46 STAT. INFERENCE LITIG. 13, 16 (1983) (describing
the Supreme Court's reasoning behind burden of proof cases as involving the
error costs at play).
177 Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 176.
178 In other words, a cyber-attack might be serious enough to rise to the level of
military force when it produces net effects equivalent to a kinetic armed strike.
See Hathaway et al., supra note 13. Examples might include a cyber-attack
that disrupts or destroys critical civilian infrastructure, such as a program
disabling a power grid.
179 Recall that the law of attribution might justifiably treat attribution for the
purposes of military action as a unique category deserving of a higher burden
of proof. See text accompanying notes 113-123. In this case, the asymmetric
error costs of war might be quite similar to the classic asymmetric error costs
of a criminal conviction, in which case the reasonable-doubt standard offers the
appropriate burden of proof to offset the disproportionate harm of erroneous
military conflagration.
180 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol
1) art. 51(5)(b), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol Additional
I]; see also id. art. 85(3)(b).
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While it is possible to conceive of an even lower burden of
proof (strict liability, for example), the preponderance standard
is the most preferable point of balance because it mandates that
a certain degree of information be presented to establish a prima
facie case, and then renders a judgment based on a comparative
analysis of the information provided by both parties. This
requirement encourages competitive information production
from both the accusing party as well as the accused party. The
preponderance standard thereby results in an optimal level of
information production, and greater information produced about
international cyber-attacks more broadly helps tackle the
uncertainty and transaction costs in state-to-state interactions
that afflict the field of cybersecurity 181 and international
relations more generally.
182
A critic might object that the preponderance standard is an
unfair one to the country defending itself from claims of
attribution. After all, the preponderance standard places the
burden equally across both parties, but one might argue that
states in the defensive role are actually in a weaker position than
that of the state bringing claims. Not only is there an asymmetry
in information, since the state bringing an attribution claim may
have (or claim to have) covert intelligence supporting its
position, but the state in a defensive role also is essentially
forced to rebut the allegations by proving a counterfactual-that
it did not in fact launch the cyber-attack. Given the potentially
complex technical skills needed to conduct an attribution, and
the fact that a number of countries may have a dearth of
individuals possessing such skills, some states may simply not
have the resources to carry out countervailing attribution efforts
given the particular challenges raised by attribution. And unlike
the individual in a criminal or civil case, who can give an account
of her alibi, the complex, many-membered state generally cannot
give a full accounting of the entirety of its functions to display
its honesty.
The counterargument is that corporations regularly give
accountings of their behavior when acting as defendants in civil
suits. And while it is true that proving a counterfactual is
difficult, especially in the case of hacking, this objection assumes
that the prima facie case for attributing an attack to a state has
already taken place. As discussed earlier, such a task is still a
challenge, even using the preponderance standard. The
preponderance standard is traditionally represented as the idea
181 See generally Jason Li, Xinming On & Raj Rajagopalan, Uncertainty and Risk
Management in Cyber Situational Awareness, in CYBER SITUATIONAL
AWARENESS: ISSUES AND RESEARCH (Sushil Jajodia et al. eds., 2010).
182 See Brian C. Rathburn, Uncertain About Uncertainty: Understanding the
Multiple Meanings of a Crucial Concept in International Relations Theory, 51
INTL STUD. Q. 533 (2007).
2018
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that a party needs to prove their claim with anything above a
fifty-percent probability.183 But it is not enough to assume that
an agnostic fact-finder begins exactly on the fifty-percent line
and can be nudged over by the accuser. While it is practically
true that adversarial frameworks force a factfinder to perform a
comparative analysis of the two parties' claims, 184 the fifty-
percent probability assumes that the defendant is merely
negating the plaintiffs claims, when in reality the defendant
frequently proposes one or more counter-narratives.
Rather than a strict tug-of-war of probabilistic truth over the
plaintiffs narrative, then, a case turns on the ratio of the
probabilistic truth of the plaintiff in relation to the probabilistic
truth of the defendant's possible counter-narratives. 185 In the
context of cyber-attacks, the objection that the preponderance
standard is plaintiff- skewed therefore makes a Bayesian
probability error; rather than presuming the absolute truth of
the plaintiffs accusations of attribution, these claims must be
compared against the underlying probability that any one of a
vast number of potential global actors was responsible for the
attack. A defendant state can then reference any number of the
technological or circumstantial bases for doubting an
attribution. 186
Moreover, the information asymmetry that supposedly
favors the accusing state is likely to be less favorable in practice
because factfinders tend to express a greater degree of
skepticism towards parties that withhold information. This has
specifically been examined in the context of international, state-
to-state adjudications before the ICJ, where the ICJ has
responded to the withholding of evidence, usually on grounds of
security, by liberally construing circumstantial evidence in favor
of the party that lacks any access to the evidence that is
withheld.187 The principles behind the ICJs actions logically
extend to other forms or forums of international adjudication. If
anything, the ICJ's response offers a rather mild reaction to the
withholding of evidence, given many domestic courts' tendency
to make an actively adverse inference from the fact that a party
withholds evidence. 188 Accordingly, a preponderance of the
183 See, e.g., MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 339, at 794 n.56
(Edward W. Cleary et al. eds., 2d ed. 1972); Ronald J. Allen, Burdens of Proof
13 LAW PROBABILITY & RISK 195, 203 (2014); Edward K. Cheng,
Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof, 122 YALE L.J. 1254, 1256 (2013);
Kaplow, supra note 158, at 779; Vern R. Walker, Preponderance, Probability
and Warranted Factfinding, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1075, 1097 (1996).
184 Cheng, supra note 183, at 1259-60.
185 Id. at 1259-62.
186 See discussion supra Section I.A.
187 See Michael P. Scharf & Margaux Day, The International Court of Justice's
Treatment of Circumstantial Evidence and Adverse Inferences, 13 CHI. J. INT'L
L. 123, 149-50 (2012).
188 See Dale A. Nance, Adverse Inferences About Adverse Inferences: Restructuring
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evidence standard would not result in an unfair plaintiff
advantage when applied to the law of attribution.
Generally, a preponderance of the evidence standard fits the
goals of attribution, since it provides the optimal balance of
deterrence and information production; a lower burden lowers
the barriers to attribution (and hence, increases the potential for
countermeasures) while still requiring a requisite level of
persuasion that would incentivize the production of relevant
intelligence and information regarding the cyber-attack. In
cases where a military strike is proposed or threatened as a
countermeasure, the law of attribution should ratchet its burden
of proof to the reasonable-doubt standard, much for the same
reasons that the standard is employed in American criminal law.
The reasonable-doubt standard recognizes the tremendously
disproportionate error rates that accompany so serious of a
penalty, and just as the risk of erroneous criminal punishment
presents a disproportionately intolerable harm, so too would an
erroneous military conflict, perhaps on an exponentially higher
scope and scale.
3. Attributing Cyber-Attacks by Non-State Actors to
States: State Responsibility Doctrine
Thus far, the law of attribution has an adversarial model,
following stages of procedure akin to the American and British
legal systems, including rules for initiating an action, the back-
and-forth sequencing of complaint and answer, and the
adversarial discovery framework for producing evidence. It also
has a general standard of proof to determine when a party has
successfully proven that another state is responsible for
launching a cyber-attack. But what if a state defends itself from
attribution by placing the blame on "non-state actors" who
happen to have operated within its borders? Should the law
attribute the malicious activity of non-state hackers to the state?
This is a particular problem for the law of attribution and
cybersecurity, given the fact that the relatively low cost of
conducting a cyber-attack opens up the option up to myriad non-
state actors, 189 who may act for a variety of motivations. And all
Juridical Roles for Responding to Evidence Tampering by Parties to Litigation,
90 B.U. L. Rev. 1089, 1094 (2010).
189 See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Cyber Power, BELFER CTR. FOR SC. & INTL AFF. 4-6, 9-
11 (May 2010),
http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/cyber-power.pdf
[http://perma.cc/3MCY-3BN5]. It is true that digital technology has lowered
the cost of entry to distribute cyber-attack capabilities more diffusely across a
number of actors. However, as a note of caution, it is important to remember
that certain high-magnitude cyber-attacks are still out of the reach of many,
and that individuals do not have the same exact capabilities of government.
See id. at 11. Certain types of cyber-attacks may be as accessible by individuals
2018
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of the typical problems associated with simply attributing an
attack risk further attenuation between the individual
conducting the hack and any chain of command or control
infrastructure that might tie that actor to a state. After all,
hackers do not wear uniforms in cyberspace. Thus, a law of
attribution must address the inevitable result where it follows
the trail to an individual hacker, and face the problem of how to
connect that person to a state for the purposes of legal
responsibility.
Fortunately, the state responsibility doctrine is a legal
problem that exists beyond the realm of cyber-attacks, and has
consequently been addressed before in other contexts. 190
International law already possesses a state responsibility
doctrine for attributing the malicious behavior of non-state
actors to a state. The International Law Commission's 2001
Draft Articles on State Responsibility set out the ways in which
international courts have held states responsible for non-state
actors. 191 Articles 4 and 8 of the Draft Articles on State
Responsibility have subsequently been recognized as customary
international law by the ICJ, 192 and courts, commentators, and
other sources have come to widely recognize these articles as
setting forth the standard view of the state responsibility
doctrine under customary international law. 193 For example,
both the first edition of the Tallinn Manual and the recently
released second edition both draw heavily on the ILC's Draft
Articles to formulate their conception of state responsibility
as they are by governments-DDOS and botnet attacks, for example. But other
sophisticated tools, such as ones that require decryption or zero-day exploits,
are much less accessible to your ordinary hacker. Contrary to certain claims
by individuals that their ten-year-old son "can do anything with a computer,"
Catherine Rampell, How Trump's 10-Year-Old Son Could Guide U.S.
Cybersecurity, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 3, 2017, 1:55 PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-cybersecurity-
computers-internet-trump-perspec-0104-20170103-story.html
[http://perma.cc/4XCA-VT6L], young hackers cannot quite do everything, at
least to the same extent as governments. As Joseph S. Nye, Jr. puts it, "[a]
teenage hacker and a large government can both do considerable damage over
the internet, but that does not make them equally powerful in the cyber
domain. Power diffusion is not the same as power equalization." Nye, Jr.,
supra, at 11.
190 See, e.g., Hathaway et al., supra note 57.
191 Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles].
192 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43,
385 (Article 4), 398 (Article 8) (Feb. 26) [hereinafter Bosnian Genocide].
193 See Hathaway et al., supra note 57, at 546 n. 12 (quoting JAMES CRAWFORD,
STATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART 43 (2013) as saying that
the ILC's Draft Articles "are considered by courts and commentators to be in
whole or in large part an accurate codification of the customary international
law of state responsibility").
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doctrine in the setting of cyber-attacks.194
The Draft Articles on State Responsibility find that a non-
state actor's wrongful behavior is attributable to a state if the
non-state actor is acting as an organ of the state or is acting
under the instructions, directions, or control of the state. 195 As
Article 4 states:
1. The conduct of any State organ shall be
considered an act of that State under
international law, whether the organ exercises
legislative, executive, judicial or any other
functions, whatever position it holds in the
organization of the State, and whatever its
character as an organ of the central Government
or of a territorial unit of the State.
2. An organ includes any person or entity which
has that status in accordance with the internal
law of the State1 96
As made clear in the commentary on Article 4, Article 4 also
extends to individuals who may be considered de facto organs of
the state. 197 Meanwhile, Article 8 of the Draft Articles also finds
the actions of non-state actors attributable to a state if they are
"acting on the instructions of, under the direction, or under the
control of' a state. 198 The conditions for state responsibility
described in Articles 4 and 8 generally have been understood as
tests for the control a state has, either over the individual actor
or over the action the individual actor has taken. 199 These
control tests, in turn, echo the control tests that have been
employed in rulings by courts like the ICJ.
2°°
However, there are a number of limitations to the existing
international law on state responsibility. Oona Hathaway et al.,
for instance, criticize the current framework as creating
perverse incentives whereby states can still escape
responsibility by handing illegal tasks to non-state actors so long
as they maintain minimal oversight.20 1 They also argue that the
194 TALLINN MANUAL 1.0, supra note 35, at 29; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 26,
at 79.
195 Draft Articles, supra note 191, arts. 4, 8.
196 Id. art. 4.
197 See Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doe. A/56/10, at art. 4, cmt. 11 (2001) [hereinafter Draft
Articles Commentary].
198 Draft Articles, supra note 191, art. 8.
199 See Hathaway et al., supra note 57, at 546-47.
200 See, e.g., Bosnian Genocide, supra note 192; Nicaragua, supra note 145.
201 See Hathaway et al., supra note 57, at 562-65.
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control test in fact disincentivizes efforts to control rogue or
malicious behavior, since the attempts to impose control might
create a sufficient degree of control to hold the state responsible
for wrongdoing that the non-state actor commits, in spite of state
efforts to police it.202 Peter Margulies, significantly, criticizes the
scope of state responsibility doctrine as applied to the task of
attributing cyber-attacks, noting that the Draft Articles' control
tests require a high bar of specific, comprehensive control, and
that such a standard would exclude very significant examples of
states directing non-state actors in conducting a cyber-attack.
20 3
Fortunately, these comments are not just critical, but
constructive, too. Hathaway et al. and Margulies propose
adjustments to remedy these shortcomings in state
responsibility rules. Margulies suggests the "virtual control
test," where "the burden shifts to a state to demonstrate it was
not responsible for a cyber attack when the state funds and
equips a private entity or individual who subsequently engages
in a cyber attack."204 Under this test, Margulies appears to
require some prima facie indication linking the accused state to
the non-state entity.20 5 However, this suggested approach to
202 Id. at 27-28.
203 See Peter Margulies, Sovereignty and Cyber Attacks: Technologys Challenge to
the Law of State Responsibility, 14 MELBOURNE J. INTL L. 496, 506-07, 510-11
(2013).
204 Id. at 5. Later in his article, Margulies expands the virtual-control standard to
also include burden-shifting to cases where a state "knowingly provides
sanctuary to a private entity that subsequently engages in a cyber attack
against another state." Id. at 19.
205 Margulies is not very clear on the precise legal conditions for when the burden
shift happens. For example, he does not explain what the accusing state's
burden of production or proof is, or what level of mens rea is required in order
to trigger the burden-shift. Would the mere allegation of funding and
equipping suffice to trigger the burden-shifting? Would the provision of
computers for an entirely different purpose count as "funding and equipping"
an entity for the virtual control test (if, for example, a rogue librarian with
access to a government-provided computer decided to hack someone)?
Margulies instead explains his virtual control test with a hypothetical
example. He writes,
Suppose that Utopia was the victim of a cyber attack ... After
a sophisticated digital forensics investigation, Utopian
officials concluded that the attack originated from an IP
address assigned to the Ruritanian Resistance Group
("RRG") .... Initial intelligence reports suggested that the
RRG received funding and software from Ruritania.
Ruritania's assistance to the RRG therefore met he "virtual
control" standard outlined here.
Id. at 20. Presumably, Utopia has made some sort of public demonstration of
the results of its "digital forensics investigation" and "[ilnitial intelligence
reports" in order to then trigger legal burden-shifting upon Ruritania (or else
the existence of those facts would not be legally relevant), indicating some sort
of initial, prima facie burden on Utopia, though the precise requirements of
that initial burden are still not clarified by his example. Id.
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state responsibility runs some of the risks described by
Hathaway et al. under the current regime, where the potential
attachment of liability to any existing relationship between the
government and a non-state actor might instead incentivize
governments to relinquish any control over the non-state actors
within its reach. Margulies might counter that the "funding and
equipping" requirement means that the virtual control test only
requires governments to exercise such oversight in cases where
it materially supports such entities, that governments naturally
have an incentive to fund non-state entities in all manner of
contexts, and that in cases where they do so, there should be a
presumed expectation of oversight. The problem with this
argument is Margulies' sparse definition of funding and/or
equipping a non-state entity-the potentially broad scope of
these terms essentially erases this limitation on the ability to
attribute an individual's wrongdoing to a state.
206
Of course, these concerns are easily remedied by defining
these terms with greater specificity. Alternatively, Hathaway et
al.'s proposal of an affirmative defense to claims of state
responsibility can complementarily tackle the problem of
perverse incentives. Hathaway et al. propose a similarly broad
obligation on behalf of states to "ensure respect" under Common
Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions by ensuring that non-state
actors within their reach do not engage in cyber-attacks. 207
While this approach raises a parallel fear about incentivizing
states to distance themselves instead of regulating, Hathaway
et al. address this concern with the idea that states should have
an affirmative defense if states can prove that they took
"reasonable steps" to prevent violations of international law.208
By incorporating these proposals into its procedural rules,
the law of attribution can not only advance the doctrines of state
responsibility, but it can do so to successfully address the novel
challenges of cyber-attack attribution with the similarly novel
solutions that Hathaway et al. and Margulies present. A more
charitable association between non-state actors and the state
they are tied to-through the virtual control test combined with
an affirmative defense of "reasonable care"-should allow a law
of attribution to attribute individuals' cyber-attacks to states,
206 Cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 25 (2010) (holding that
"[miaterial support meant to 'promot[eJ peaceable, lawful conduct' can further
terrorism" merely by freeing up resources). Even when the material support
statute at issue had a mens rea requirement, the Court interpreted the mens
rea requirement merely to require knowledge that the entity at issue was a
designated foreign terrorist organization, not knowledge that the support at
issue may be used to support terrorist activity. Thus, there is a dual problem
of not knowing what mens rea is sufficient to trigger the burden-shifting, and
not knowing to which elements the mens rea requirement might apply.
20 Hathaway et al., supra note 57, at 1, 40.
208 Id. at 42-46.
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while allowing states the proper means of protecting themselves
from liability when they take good-faith measures to prevent
wrongdoing.
4. Sensitive Intelligence & Evidentiary Rules
Suppose a state has suffered a cyber-attack and wishes to
bring a legal claim attributing that attack to another state. With
everything laid out so far, the state knows the procedure for
initiating an action and the back-and-forth sequencing of
complaint and answer, summary judgment arguments, and the
production of the evidence. Here, in this last step, the state runs
into a problem: what happens if significant portions of the
evidence on which it relies are derived from covert
intelligence? 209 Moreover, states may have plausible factual
bases for attributing an attack, but may not want to disclose
such evidence on legitimate grounds, since cyber-attackers could
learn from those points of attribution and avoid leaving the same
fingerprints in the future.210 The law of attribution faces the
challenge of reconciling the need to present such evidence with
states' desires to preserve the secrecy of their confidential
intelligence and their sources.
The adversarial system addresses this dilemma to some
extent: since the parties have control over pushing forward a
claim, one answer is to simply dismiss this problem out of hand
and say "tough luck, the onus falls on the state to decide what to
do in such a situation." Under a cost-benefit calculation, this
position would say that such disclosure is the price to pay for
seeking recourse against a cyber-aggressor, and that it would
entirely be up to the state to weigh the benefits of seeking
recourse versus the costs of disclosing information about its
covert intelligence capacities. The problem with this approach is
that it assumes that the costs of cyber-attacks are purely
internal to the states subject to the precise attack at issue. If,
however, we understand cyber-attacks to be a general, global,
and iterative phenomenon,211 and that a state unchecked in its
cyber-aggression will proceed to conduct future cyber-attacks
against others, then the act of attribution (and the fact that it
209 As noted previously, many of the recent major cyber-attacks have been
attributed to actors on the basis of covert intelligence. See supra notes 91-93
and accompanying text.
210 See Rid & Buchanan, supra note 39, at 33.
211 Which is particularly true of cyber-attacks, given how easily the tools of cyber-
attack can be disseminated to other actors. For example, almost immediately
after the Mirai botnet attacks, the code used for the attack was dumped online
for anybody to copy and use themselves. See Robert Hackett, Why a Hacker
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enables countermeasures to deter future attacks) produces
positive externalities that are not accounted for in the "tough
luck" mindset.
Consequently, a law of attribution should strive to
accommodate a state's secrecy and attribution interests by
finding a way to allow states to present sensitive intelligence as
evidence while preserving the secrecy of such evidence from the
broader public. This is not the first time that courts have
grappled with the role of sensitive intelligence in court. Courts
have long balanced the sensitive security concerns of states with
the public role of courts, and have developed a number of
managerial tools to protect the information produced or used in
a hearing. There are two primary procedures that a law of
attribution can incorporate to accommodate states' desires to
protect classified information. First, courts can have procedures
for hearing evidence ex parte and in camera, and second, courts
can seal their dockets and records when such records contain
classified information.
A number of national courts employ such procedures to
secure classified information when it is necessary to prove a
claim in court. In the United States, the Foreign Surveillance
Intelligence Act of 1978 (FISA) created the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court,212 which reviews federal law enforcement
and intelligence officers' requests for surveillance warrants.213
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court conducts its
proceedings ex parte and in camera, with few of its rulings ever
reaching the public. 214 These procedural moves are not limited
to specialized courts. The Classified Information Procedure Act
allows U.S. courts in criminal cases to review classified
information ex parte and in camera to determine whether the
evidence is essential for a fair trial or criminal due process
requirements. 215 And, as a general matter, in civil claims
brought before a federal court, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26 allows sealing of court records on good cause.216
Other countries possess similar procedures for shielding
proceedings or evidence used at trial. The United Kingdom
212 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1885c.
213 50 U.S.C. §1804.
214 See Conor Clarke, Is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Really a
Rubber Stamp? Ex Parte Proceedings and the FISC Win Rate, 66 STAN. L. REV.
125 (2014); Eric Lichtblau, In Secret, Court Vastly Broadens Powers of N.S.A.,
N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/07/us/in-secret-
court-vastly-broadens-powers -of-nsa.html [http://perma.cc/ELM5-Q9JM].
215 Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), 18 U.S.C. app. III §§ 1-16; see
also Fred F. Manget, Intelligence and the Criminal Law System, 17 STAN. L. &
POLYREV. 415, 424 (2006).
216 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c); see also Hon. T. S. Ellis, III, Sealing, Judicial
Transparency and Judicial Independence, 53 VILL. L. REV. 939, 945 (2008);
David A. Schulz, Rethinking Confidentiality and Access in Civil Litigation, 23
COMM. LAW. 24, 25 (2005-2006).
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passed the Justice and Security Act in 2013, creating closed
material procedures (CMPs), secret court hearings where only
the judge and specialized security-cleared advocates are given
access to any sensitive intelligence at issue in the case. 217
Similarly, the Netherlands' Act on Shielded Witnesses provides
for a special procedure whereby a special magistrate can hear
representatives of the Netherlands' two main intelligence
agencies to determine whether certain information should stay
secret, or whether certain witnesses should have their identities
cloaked in anonymity. 218 Such evidence is used in Dutch
administrative, civil, and criminal cases, and this procedure, like
that of the United States FISA courts, is largely conducted ex
parte and in camera, though it is possible for the parties to the
case to be present when the special magistrate evaluates the
sensitive intelligence. 219 Germany and Spain, meanwhile,
prohibit the use of secret evidence at trial, though testimony or
anonymous information based on secret evidence may
sometimes be permitted.
220
Ex parte and in camera procedures benefit the law of
attribution in a number of ways. Adding these types of
proceedings creates flexibility for the system, allowing
factfinders to analyze the issues that sensitive intelligence
raises on a case-by-case basis. Ex parte proceedings in particular
may allow a factfinder to negotiate with a party on issues of
disclosure, since parties may tend to overestimate the cost of
disclosing their own information, a form of loss-aversion.221 In
camera proceedings allow sensitive evidence to obtain its full
evidentiary value, while mitigating the cost of disclosure more
generally.
222
217 Justice and Security Act 2013, c. 18 (UK),
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/18/contents [http://perma.cc/NT9S-
MV86]; see also Directorate-Gen. for Internal Policies, Policy Dep't, National
Intelligence and Secret Evidence in Legislation and Before the Courts:
Exploring the Challenges, STUDY FOR LIBE COMMITTEE 21-25 (2014),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2014/509991/IPOL ST
U(2014)509991 EN.pdf [http://perma.cc/X5UW-DP86] [hereinafter National
Security and Secret Evidence].
218 Wet van 28 september 2006, Stb. 2006, 460,
www.eerstekamer.nl/behandeling/20061024/publicatie wet 14/document3/f=/
w29743st.pdf [http://perma.cc/K6VV-QSBW]; see also National Security and
Secret Evidence, supra note 217, at 25-26.
219 See National Security and Secret Evidence, supra note 217, at 25-26.
220 Id. at 27-28.
221 See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, The Endowment
Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 199-203
(1991).
222 Of course, procedures need to be put in place to impose sanctions on a state for
breaking the terms of the in camera proceedings, which a state could do in
reckless rage were a court to make an adverse finding against it. Even if both
parties complied with the nondisclosure requirements of the proceeding,
however, in camera proceedings may still have shortcomings since the
information will inevitably be disclosed to the opposing party. This is especially
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There are also costs to having secrecy rules in a legal
proceeding. Transparency in a legal proceeding tends to bestow
upon it a greater air of legitimacy,223 while secrecy might serve
to undermine it. Furthermore, if one of the overriding goals of
the law of attribution is to justify a countermeasure in the eyes
of the international community, a secret hearing might leave
many in the international community skeptical of the
countermeasure's legitimacy. Can a law of attribution legitimize
countermeasures behind closed doors?
224
This is a difficult question, and the answer revolves around
the question of from where courts or legal judgments derive their
authority. While it is true that the open display of a judicial
proceeding may contribute some legitimacy to the process by
virtue of its transparency, it does not follow that such openness
is dispositive when it comes to binding judicial legitimacy. After
all, the countries discussed previously have successfully
incorporated measures of secrecy into their legal systems
without undermining the legitimacy of their legal rulings.
225 Of
course, those institutions did not begin with closed proceedings,
nor do most of them shield the majority of their cases behind
closed proceedings. It may be that society accepts the closure of
certain records because those judicial institutions have already
built up legitimacy through a general openness of proceedings
over time.
While this need for prior openness may seem to pose a
challenge for a new, private international legal system, surveys
concerning in the realm of attribution, given the fact that sensitive intelligence
that tends to attribute an attack is most likely sensitive intelligence that the
attributing state collected from the attributed state, and the disclosure is most
undesirable when it results in the spying state revealing its intelligence to the
very state who is being spied on.
223 See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. for Riverside Cty., 478 U.S. 1, 9
(1986) (holding that "openness in criminal trials, including the selection of
jurors, 'enhances both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the
appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system"');
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980) (describing
"the importance of openness to the proper functioning of a trial; it gave
assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned, and it
discouraged perjury, the misconduct of participants, and decisions based on
secret bias or partiality").
224 A judgment of attribution need not necessarily be tied to a subsequent
countermeasure or sanction against the state determined to be responsible for
a cyber-attack. In this case, attribution might serve as a symbolic shaming,
"outing" the guilty party to the world. It seems doubtful, though, that states
would expend the time and resources to acquire a legal judgment of attribution
purely for its symbolic effect.
225 With that said, the more secretive proceedings do tend to attract some criticism
and controversy. See, e.g., Alan Butler, Standing Up to Clapper: How to
Increase Transparency and Oversight of FISA Surveillance, 48 NEw ENG. L.
REV. 55 (2013); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Secret Evidence is Slowly Eroding the
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of public opinion suggest that international courts derive their
legitimacy in the public eye not from an individual court's
specific legitimacy, but from the general trust that the public
places in international institutions and their own systems of
law.226 If members of the public generally trust international
institutions and their own domestic courts, that trust bleeds
over into support for international courts. This finding comports
with broader jurisprudential accounts of authority, which
suggest that it is the office or institution of courts that claim
authority, and not merely the pure power to persuade.227 Thus,
it is not necessarily the public presentation of evidence or the
persuasiveness of a particular adjudicator's reasoning that
compels adherence to the ruling of an adjudicator.228 Rather, the
process itself produces this credibility. After all, in the United
States, the large majority of cases brought before federal
appellate courts are terminated via unpublished "no-opinion"
orders, indicating that the resolution of legal controversies does
not demand a purely transparent window into the legal
process.229
In fact, other international courts have maintained their
legitimacy, despite the use of secret proceedings. The European
Court of Human Rights, for instance, encountered this precise
issue in A v. United Kingdom, where the ECHR reviewed the
United Kingdom's procedure for permitting detention of an
individual on evidence that included "secret material."230 The
226 See Eric Voeten, Public Opinion and the Legitimacy of International Courts, 14
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 411 (2013). While it is true that the public opinion
of citizens may not map perfectly onto the views of states, and international
law must have legitimacy in the eyes of states in this context, states
themselves are bound by their entanglement and commitment to many of these
international institutions, meaning that they, too, are probably subject to buy-
in in terms of these legal institutions' legitimacy.
221 See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Authority, Law and Morality, 68 MONIST 295, 299 (1985).
Raz offers his preemption thesis, a component of authority, as holding that
"[tihe fact that an authority requires performance of an action is a reason for
its performance which is not to be added to all other relevant reasons when
assessing what to do, but [that] should replace some of them." Id. at 299. By
describing the judgment of authority as not merely one "to be added to all other
relevant reasons when assessing what to do," id., Raz acknowledges that
authority is not merely an exercise in persuasion among all the other factors
that might persuade an individual, but instead ascribes authority to the
general aspect of the institution that itself provides a heuristic authority
superseding or supplanting the general process of pure reasoning that might
otherwise produce further controversy.
228 After all, courts' opinions fall subject to criticism, both academic and in popular
opinion, all the time. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor,
100 HARv. L. REV. 731, 731 (1987).
229 See Patricia Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial
Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1373 n.3 (1995).
230 A v. United Kingdom, 49 EHRR 29 (2009); see also DANIEL ALATI ET AL., THE
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accumulation of this empirical experience, from both national
and international courts, demonstrates that the law of
attribution can easily employ the methods of in camera and ex
parte proceedings. Of course, these procedures should not be
applied haphazardly, but must judiciously be used with the
appropriate procedural rigor. Nonetheless, the existence of
procedures to review private material allows states to present
sensitive intelligence in claims of attribution while preserving
the secrecy of that intelligence.
B. Lessons for a Legal Framework for a
Law of Attribution
In sum, the proposed law of attribution possesses the
following characteristics. First, it operates as an adversarial
institution, where both claims and the record are largely
developed by the litigating parties. Second, consistent with an
adversarial framework, the rules of procedure temporally
sequence the stages of a case in the back-and-forth manner that
characterizes a typical adversarial egal proceeding. Third, upon
reaching the merits, an accusing state must prove its claim of
attribution by the preponderance of the evidence, except in
instances where the accusing state wishes to employ a military
countermeasure. In cases where a state has not disclosed its
planned countermeasure, or where such an option is still
uncertain, the case may proceed on the preponderance standard,
but that will not be sufficient to justify later military action.
Fourth, to meet this burden of proof, states will have the option
of employing procedures like in camera review, ex parte
hearings, and the sealing of records in order to use sensitive
evidence to prove their claims. Fifth and finally, the state
proving the attribution claim needs to specifically prove that the
attack can be linked to individuals operating on the behest of a
state or under the control of a state, where the control test will
be interpreted charitably under the "virtual control test"
espoused by Margulies. Simultaneously, states will have the
affirmative defense of demonstrating due diligence in their
policing of the relevant non-state actors.
III. MODELS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE LAW OF
ATTRIBUTION
With the legal framework for attribution drawn out, how can
this theory be fully fleshed out and brought to life? The next part
of this Note addresses the more policy-oriented side of
attribution, which mainly explores questions of institutional
setting: where the judgment will take place, and by whom. These
questions of venue and forum are invariably tied to the crucial,
2018
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practical requirement of designing an institutional model where
states will have the incentive to participate in such a legal
system. The issue of state compliance with international
institutions or laws is, of course, a vast subject of discussion all
in itself. 231 Structural explanations of international law and
institutions run the gamut, from Kantian philosophy 232 to
rational choice theory.233 And discussions of state compliance in
specific subject areas have arisen in nearly every context,
including criminal law, 234 environmental law, 235 and human
rights law.23
6
While this Note can proffer general, structural analysis
regarding state incentives to participate, the problem of state
cooperation or compliance is as much a political question as a
legal one. In order to produce a fully predictive claim for how
states might involve themselves in such a legal framework, a
proposal would have to call upon 1) international relations, both
on a broad theoretical level and specific to this historical
moment; 2) behavioral economics, to analyze incentives, costs,
and the probabilities of behavior given the various actors in play;
and 3) specific historical and psychological analysis of many of
the players who might be important in bringing about such a
legal regime.
A full answer to the questions raised by the challenge of
international compliance reaches beyond the bounds of this
231 See, e.g., GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Lisa Martin ed., 2008); JACK L. GOLDSMITH &
ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); George W. Downs
& Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and International Law, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. S95 (2002); Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of
International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823 (2002); Oona A. Hathaway, Between
Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. L.
REV. 469 (2005); Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A
Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis, 15 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 907 (2004); Beth
A. Simmons, Capacity, Commitment, and Compliance: International
Institutions and Territorial Disputes, 46 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 829 (2002); Beth
A. Simmons, International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and
Compliance in International Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 819
(2000); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello & Stepan Wood,
International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of
Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367 (1998); Harold Hongju
Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997)
(book review).
232 See Fernando R. Tes6n, The Kantian Theory of International Law, 92 COLUM.
L. REV. 53 (1992).
233 See ANDREW T. GUZMAN, How INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE
THEORY (2008).
234 See Beth A. Simmons & Allison Danner, Credible Commitments and the
International Criminal Court, 64 INTL ORG. 225 (2010).
235 See, e.g., Daniel Brodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A
Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L.
596 (1999).
236 See, e.g., BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009).
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Note.237 This Note instead takes the more modest approach of
discussing the general incentives for state buy-in by surveying
various other forms of international adjudication. Thus, I
examine three examples of international adjudication: the
International Court of Justice, the World Trade Organization's
dispute settlement process, and ad hoc systems like the US-Iran
Tribunal. Each institution reflects a different approach to
international adjudication, providing models for how
international institutions have succeeded in getting states to
participate in their systems. The ICJ presents the option of
incorporating the law of attribution within an existing forum
that has broad subject matter jurisdiction. The WTO's dispute
resolution process reflects an adjudicatory system with
specialized subject matter, and the US-Iran Tribunal models an
ad hoc, state-to-state approach that may more flexibly resolve
conflicts between two particular states, but lacks the power
create more lasting legal authority.
A. The International Court of Justice
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the paradigmatic
example of an international legal institution. Established by the
United Nations Charter in 1946, 238 the ICJ was the only
international court in existence for much of the twentieth
century.239 Consequently, the ICJ not only serves as a model for
creating a new international legal system-it provides an
existing forum where the law of attribution might be
incorporated. As a general matter, the ICJ has broad subject-
matter jurisdiction to hear any international law claim brought
before it, so long as it is brought with the consent of both
parties.240 Incorporating the law of attribution into the ICJ
would have the advantage of attaching the law of attribution to
a preexisting institution that has established credibility,
institutional history, and fully developed rules and resources.
Prior to the creation of the ICJ, several attempts had been
237 For example, there is the challenge of non-signatory states. All three
adjudicatory models examined by this Note require the consent of the party
states, which raises the question of how a state-such as the United States-
might address behavior by a "rogue" or non-signatory state, such as North
Korea. While the question of non-compliance is beyond the scope of this paper,
the creation of international institutions may be one small and incremental
step towards encouraging cooperation. Cf. Choe Sang-Hun & Mark Landler,
North Korea Signals Willingness to 'Denuclearize,' South Says, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 6, 2018), http://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/06/world/asia/north-korea-
south-nuclear-weapons.html [http://perma.cc/QW4G-RSU3].
238 See THIRLWAY, supra note 143, at 3.
239 See Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Danger of Fragmentation or Unification of the
International Legal System and the International Court of Justice, 31 N.Y.U.
J. INT'LL. & POL. 791, 791 (1999).
240 See THIRLWAY, supra note 143, at 35.
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made at creating international institutions for state-to-state
dispute resolution. The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA),
for example, was created following the Hague Peace Conference
of 1899.241 Despite its name, the Permanent Court of Arbitration
was not a permanent standing court, but instead provided an
administrative organization where states could select
arbitrators from a pool of candidates and create their own
tribunals to resolve disputes.242 And although the PCA provided
a set of procedural rules, these rules were mere defaults that
would be overridden by whatever choice of rules the state parties
elected to institute themselves.243 After the creation of the PCA
in 1899, a follow-up conference took place in 1907, where several
states, including the United States, proposed the creation of an
actual, permanent court.
244
Though the proposals in 1907 failed to gain traction at the
time, the devastation wrought by World War One spurred
movement towards the creation of an international court, finally
culminating in the precursor to the ICJ: the Permanent Court of
International Justice (PCIJ).245 The PCIJ was created in 1921
under the League of Nations.246 In its twenty-five year tenure,247
the PCIJ produced thirty-two judgments, all of which were
implemented. 248 The PCIJ also issued twenty-seven advisory
opinions in this period, with states adhering to or acting upon
most of these advisory rulings.249 All in all, the PCIJ laid a
successful groundwork for the later ICJ.
250
The ICJ was created with the establishment of the United
Nations Charter in 1946, and was modeled closely after the
PCIJ.251 The ICJ is composed of fifteen judges elected by the
Security Council and General Assembly.252 These members are
elected for nine-year terms in separate elections, with elections
focusing on the judges as individuals and not as representatives
of their countries.253 The ICJ also incorporates a number of rules
241 See ROBERT KOLB, THE ELGAR COMPANION TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE 6 (William A. Schabas ed., 2014).
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 7.
245 Id. at 12.
246 Id. at 13.
247 The PCIJ existed from 1921 until 1946, when the present ICJ was established.
See THIRLWAY, supra note 143, at 3.
248 See KOLB, supra note 241, at 12.
249 Id.
250 The dissolution of the PCIJ was mainly due to its close attachment to the
League of Nations, which itself was dissolved in the aftermath of World War
II. See id. at 22-24.
251 See THIRLWAY, supra note 143, at 3.
252 See id. at 9.
253 Id. The specific length of the nine-year term is a holdover from the PCIJ, and
it attempts to strike the balance between providingjudges with a secure tenure
so as to not have their decision making corrupted by the politics of re-election,
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to ensure the independence of its judiciary. These include rules
requiring members of the court to make solemn declarations of
impartiality in the performance of their duties; the ICJ further
strives to eliminate potential conflicts of interest 254 by
prohibiting its members from "exercis[ing] any political or
administrative function, or engag[ing] in any other occupation of
a professional nature" in their time as judges on the court.
255
Furthermore, members of the ICJ cannot be removed unless the
rest of the Court's members unanimously find that a judge has
failed to fulfill his or her duties.
256
Articles 34 through 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice lay out the ICJ's jurisdiction, giving it grounds
to consider all legal disputes257 concerning:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if
established, would constitute a breach of
an international obligation; [and]
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be
made for the breach of an international
obligation.
258
Cyber-attacks, and the law of attribution, certainly touch
upon legal questions falling within the ICJ's purview. Cyber-
attacks potentially rise to a level of armed force in violation of
on the one hand, and not offering appointment for life in order to have the
judicial membership represent the diverse body of nations that were party to
the court, on the other. See id.
254 Cases involving a judge's state of national origin do not create cause for
recusal; reasons for recusal are determined in Articles 17 and 24 of the Statute,
which require the judge not to participate only if the judge has previously
participated in the case for one of the parties or the court, Statute of the
International Court of Justice, art. 17, 2, or in cases involving a "special
reason" for recusal, id. art. 24., 1-2.
255 See THIRLWAY, supra note 143, at 12.
256 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 254, art. 18, 1.
257 Here, someone might object that the requirement of a legal "dispute" precludes
the ICJ from hearing a claim of attribution because the limitation of
jurisdiction to "disputes" sounds similar to the standing requirement in U.S.
law. The party making this claim might argue that the attribution is an
incomplete claim since the declaratory ruling of attribution is insufficient to
redress the real harm at issue (the cyber-attack). This argument, however, is
no obstacle given the ICJ's broad interpretation of what counts as a dispute.
ICJ rulings demonstrate that the elements of showing a dispute simply entail
"the claim of one party is positively opposed by the other," and that "the matter
is one of substance, not of form." THIRLWAY, supra note 143, at 54 (citing South
West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.), Preliminary Objections, 1962 l.C.J. Rep. 328 (Dec.
21); and Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ. Fed'n), Preliminary Objections,
2011 I.C.J. Rep. 84, 30 (Apr. 1)).
258 Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 254, art. 36, 2.
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Article 2(4), 259 while also posing potential violations of the
doctrines of state sovereignty and neutrality.260 Attribution, as
a necessarily ancillary question to that of cyber-attack,
implicates such questions of international law. While the ICJ
has not yet heard any disputes concerning the use of cyber-
attacks, 261 the jurisdictional scope outlined above appears to
place such disputes well within its bounds.
With this general overview, we can now ask: What factors
led to the ICJ's formation, and what lessons might those teach
for implementing the law of attribution? It is difficult to
dissociate the creation of the ICJ (and its predecessor, the PCIJ)
from the historical moments that gave birth to these two
institutions. The First and Second World Wars no doubt played
a significant role in the creation not only of these courts,26 2 but
the international organizations that these courts are tied to.
26 3
As a matter of history, they appear to teach the story of
international law arising in response to international tragedy.
As a narrative, this is both encouraging and troubling. It is
encouraging because it suggests the possibility of states
embracing the creation of new international laws and
institutions to deal with contemporary challenges like those of
cyber-attacks and global cybersecurity. It is troubling because it
may be that states are compelled to create such institutions only
when such challenges have grown to the degree that they result
in an international catastrophe or event causing widespread
harm. Such broad generalizations, of course, are not the end-all-
be-all for the practical implementation of the law of attribution.
After all, more localized events like the Estonia cyber-attack
have spurred groups such as the one that came together to create
259 See Hathaway et al., supra note 13; Waxman, supra note 59.
260 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 26, at 11-29, 553-562.
261 See List of All Cases, INT'L CT. JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/en/list-of-all-cases
[http://perma.cc/HUL6-HZBL]. The closest case appears to be a ruling issued
in Timor-Leste v. Australia, which concerned Australia's seizure of documents
and data from legal advisors to Timor-Leste. See Questions Relating to the
Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and Data (Timor-Leste v. Austl.),
Provisional Measures, 2014 I. C.J. Rep. 147 (Mar. 3). The third prong of the ICJ
order, for instance, commands that "Australia shall not interfere in any way in
communications between Timor-Leste and its legal advisers in connection
with" a pending maritime arbitration. Id. at 161. In this case, however, the
seizure of electronic data simply accompanied the physical seizure of
documents from an office, meaning that the ruling did not examine the issues
of cyber-attack, cyber-espionage, or any other related digital breach of
sovereignty.
262 See History, INT'L CT. JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/en/history
[http://perma.cc/CHU9-AL3N].
263 Lessons of Second World War Must Continue to Guide United Nations Work,
General Assembly Told During Meeting Marking Seventieth Anniversary,
UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/ga11641.doc.htm
[http://perma.cc/TX22-GATK] ("The lessons of World War Il-on whose ashes
the United Nations was founded-must continue to guide the Organization's
work .... ).
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the Tallinn Manual and its sequel,26 4 hinting at the possibility
of preemptive, rather than reactive, implementation of
international law.
B. WTO Dispute Settlement System
A second model for implementing the law of attribution
would be through an institution such as the World Trade
Organization's dispute settlement process. Unlike the ICJ
model, which provides for a standing court with broad subject-
matter jurisdiction, the WTO's dispute settlement system is a
model that attaches an adjudicatory process to an international
body with a specific subject-matter focus. Employing this kind of
model would have the advantage of implementing the law of
attribution through a specialized body of factfinders who might
be best equipped to address the technical complexity of the
evidence and techniques by which states and their experts trace
malicious digital activity back to its creators.
The WTO was created under the Marrakesh Agreement, one
of several agreements made in the 1994 Uruguay Round.26 5 The
WTO was generally formed to promote and oversee global trade,
and the WTO's dispute settlement system is one of the express
functions laid out in Article III of the Marrakesh Agreement that
are meant to help the institution achieve such a goal. 266
Meanwhile, the structure and procedure of the WTO's dispute
settlement process is laid out more precisely in the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Use of
Disputes (DSU). 267 Under Article 1 of the DSU, the dispute
settlement process can be applied to disputes covered under a
number of specified agreements, including the 1994 Multilateral
Agreements on Trade in Goods26 8 and the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.
2 9
The dispute settlement process is administered by the
264 Michael Phillip Roush, Securitization and Desecuritization in Estonia's Cyber
Politics (May 2015) (unpublished Master's thesis, Tampere University),
http://tampub.uta.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/97769/GRADU- 1436946969.pdf
[http://perma.cc/2ABB-5NB7].
265 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].
266 Id. art. III.
261 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
art. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].
268 Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867
U.N.T.S. 190.
269 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/27-
trips.pdf [http://perma.cc/T235-P6G3] [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
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Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which oversees the operation of
WTO's settlement panels and the implementation of their
rulings.270 The actual function of the panels is determined by the
rules set out by the DSU.271 These rules include provisions for
establishing adjudicatory panels, the composition of such panels,
panel procedures, and various other ground rules for how each
panel is to perform its decision making process.272 For instance,
the DSU prescribes the conditions for initiating a dispute
settlement panel, stating that the DSB shall create a settlement
panel when a complaining party requests one "in writing," and
that such request "shall indicate whether consultations were
held, identify the specific measures at issue and provide a brief
summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present
the problem clearly." 273 Additionally, the DSU regulates the
composition of its panels, imposing requirements such as the
fact that none of the panelists may be from a country party to a
dispute (unless tipulated to by both parties).274 In terms of the
decision-making process, the DSU's provisions also require its
panels to create specific timelines for its decisions,275 sets forth
specific stages of review and the procedures for those specific
stages,276 and establishes the types of information that the panel
may review or consult. 277 Accordingly, the DSU lays out a
comprehensive regime for adjudication.
Naturally, such an institution has attracted scholarly
attention regarding its effectiveness in inducing state
participation and compliance. On the issue of state participation,
a more specialized forum may raise the concern that more
powerful states with a vested interest in the subject area may
use such an institution merely as a means to throw their weight
around. Chad P. Bown, for example, produced an empirical
study suggesting that a country's retaliatory capacities, legal
capacities, and role in international political-economic
relationships were significant in measuring that state's
likelihood of participating in the dispute resolution system.2
78
270 DSU, supra note 267, art. 2.
271 Id. arts. 6-16.
272 Id.
273 Id. art. 6, 2.
274 Id. art. 8, 3.
275Id. art. 12, 3-12.
276 Id. art. 15.
277 Id. art. 13 (giving panels the right to "seek information and technical advice
from any individual or body which it deems appropriate" so long as notice is
provided to the parties); id. art. 18, 1 (forbidding exparte contacts concerning
the case under consideration).
278 Chad P. Bown, Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Complainants,
Interested Parties, and Free Riders, 19 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 287, 307-08
(2005) ("Even after controlling for the economic importance of disputed sector
market access, variables that serve as proxies for the institutional bias
generated by the current rules of the system also affect the nonparticipation
choice .... [D]espite market access interests in a dispute, an exporting country
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Bown's findings raise the concern that a specialized institution
may simply become a tool for powerful states to institutionalize
their dominant power in certain domains, such as trade or
cybersecurity. Of course, this problem may simply be a feature
of asymmetric international power, or the result of wealth
inequality affecting law more generally.
279
In the end, even if there is a participation bias towards
certain states, if systems of law have value not merely by
adjudicating claims for one party or another, but for the positive
externalities that the institution of law brings in creating
greater predictability and cooperation among states, then the
skew in participation may be a tolerable price to pay. Other
empirical studies suggest that such laws do provide these
positive externalities. Michael Bechtel and Thomas Sattler, for
instance, find that there is minimal difference in the economic
benefits given to complainant parties and passive third parties
that sign onto the claims brought by complainants before the
WTO. 280 Such results indicate that "weaker" states have the
option of freeriding on the efforts of more powerful states in
gaining the benefits of increased trade, and that the
adjudicatory process produces spillover benefits that may
benefit states more broadly. And to the extent that the WTO
dispute settlement process has been effective in engendering
compliance from the parties that do come before it, 281 the
compliance produced by this process, and the positive
externalities that follow, may very well tell the tale of a
successful international adjudicatory regime.
Not only does the WTO dispute resolution system offer a
model of international adjudication-the story of how the TRIPS
agreement came to be incorporated into the WTO offers a
is less likely to participate in WTO litigation if it has inadequate power for
trade retaliation, if it is poor and does not have the capacity to absorb
substantial legal costs, if it is particularly reliant on the respondent country
for bilateral assistance, or if it is engaged with the respondent in a preferential
trade agreement").
279 See, e.g., Edward Glaeser, Jose Scheinkman & Andrei Shleifer, The Injustice
of Inequality, 50 J. MONETARY ECON. 199 (2003); Beverly Moran & Stephanie
M. Wildman, Race and Wealth Disparity: The Role of Law and the Legal
System, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1219, 1235 (2007) ("Access to lawyers and the
legal system is another form of wealth .... [Liegal rules have tremendous
impact on the protection of property rights, the creation of bargaining power,
and the determination of wealth distribution. Just as legal rules act to
concentrate other types of wealth, such as education, housing, and tax benefits,
legal resources are yet another type of wealth that remains unevenly
distributed....").
280 Michael M. Bechtel & Thomas Sattler, What is Litigation in the World Trade
Organization Worth?, 69 INT'L ORG. 375, 395-96 (2015).
281 See Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global
Governance by Judiciary, 27 EUR. J. INT'L L. 9 (2016); Bruce Wilson,
Compliance by WTO Members with Adverse WTO Dispute Settlement Rulings:
The Record to Date, 10 J. INTL ECON. L. 397 (2007).
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practical lesson for how certain legal regimes might be folded
into international institutions with larger buy-in. In Private
Power, Public Law: The Globalization of International Property
Rights, Susan Sells traces the history of how the TRIPS
agreement came to be woven into the fabric of the WTO. 282 In
this historical narrative, Sells draws attention to the "central
player in this drama," the "US-based twelve member Intellectual
Property Committee" that consisted of twelve chief executive
officers representing various industries.283 Thus, concentrated
lobbying can play a prominent role in implementing certain
regulatory regimes into international law and in mobilizing
states to act as strong advocates of such systems. Given the
increasingly high risk that cyber-attacks pose to private
commercial entities-take the Sony attack, for example, or the
Yahoo cyberattack 284 -there is a definite opportunity for
commercial companies to play a prominent role in lobbying to
successfully institutionalize international regimes like the
proposed law of attribution.
C. Mass Claims Commissions (The
United States-Iran Tribunal)
A third model for implementing a law of attribution would be
through ad hoc tribunals, such as the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal created in 1981.285 The Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal (the Tribunal) is an example of a purely bilateral mass
claims commission that came into existence through a treaty
made between two states.286 Unlike the prior two models, the
tribunal system arises in response to a specific set of claims
between two parties. This approach has the advantage of
282 SUSAN K. SELLS, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003). The TRIPS agreement was an
agreement that institutionalized a stringent and enforceable global
intellectual property regime. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 269, pmbl.
283 SELLS, supra note 282, at 1.
284 See Mike Levine & Emily Shapiro, How Russian Agents Allegedly Directed
Massive Yahoo Cyberattack, ABC NEWS (Mar. 15, 2017, 4:34 PM ET),
http://abcnews. go.com/US/russian-agents-facing-charges-yahoo-hacking-
attacks/story?id=46142396 [http://perma.cc/2982-M42Q].
285 Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of
Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran art. II,
Jan. 19, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 223 [hereinafter Claims Settlement Declaration].
Though it was created to adjudicate a specific set of claims between Iran and
the United States, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, like the ICJ, was
also physically seated at The Hague. See KOLB, supra note 241, at 53.
286 While there are examples of mass claims commissions that operated through
the United Nations (such as the UN Compensation Commission), as opposed
to directly between two states, this Section's emphasis is on the bilateral
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flexibility, allowing implementation tailored to specific
circumstances and parties involved. But it also comes at the cost
of having its effect be limited in scope, both in terms of the
parties subject to such an ad hoc tribunal and in terms of the
historical events that are justiciable under the tribunal.
The Tribunal was created as part of an agreement o resolve
the Iranian Hostage Crisis. 287 In the Revolution of 1979,
Iranians stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, taking sixty-nine
people captive.288 While a number of the hostages were released,
fifty-two remained captive for 444 days.28 9 The Algiers Accords
helped broker an agreement between the United States and
Iran, where Iran would release the American hostages in
exchange for the United States removing trade sanctions and
unfreezing a number of Iranian assets. 290 Significantly, the
Algiers Accord also sought to address a multitude of private
claims that U.S. citizens raised against Iran, and that Iranian
citizens raised against the United States.29 1 The Algiers Accord
addressed these by shifting them from litigation to arbitration-
and hence, the formation of the Tribunal.
The Claims Settlement Declaration formally established the
Tribunal, including the terms of its jurisdiction, composition,
and arbitral rules.292 Jurisdictionally, the Tribunal was limited
to hearing two categories of claims 293: 1) claims "of nationals of
the United States against Iran and claims of nationals of Iran
against the United States, and any counterclaim which arises
out of the same contract, transaction or occurrence that
constitutes the subject matter of that national's claim,"' 294 and 2)
official claims "of the United States and Iran against each other
arising out of contractual arrangements between them for the
purchase and sale of goods and services."295 In establishing its
adjudicators, the Claim Settlement Declaration determined that
the Tribunal was to be composed of nine members: three
appointed by the United States, three appointed by Iran, with
287 See Richard M. Mosk, Lessons from The Hague An Update on the Iran- United
States Claims Tribunal, 14 PEPP. L. REV. 819, 819-21 (1987).





290 See Mosk, supra note 287, at 820.
291 Id. at 819-20.
292 Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 285.
293 Besides limiting claims based on their substance, the Tribunal also limited
claims procedurally by requiring them to be filed with the Tribunal by Jan. 19,
1982. See id. art. 111(4). Thus, the Tribunal's procedural rules also served to
limit and funnel the historical scope of the claims that the Tribunal would
reach.
294 Id. art. 11(1).
295 Id. art. 11(2).
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those six members then appointing the last three members of
the Tribunal.
296
For its procedures, the Tribunal adopted the arbitral rules of
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL). 297 These rules, in turn, created a comprehensive
set of procedures that governed the stages of hearing, including
the method of conducting examination and the production of
evidence.298 These rules also provided a significant degree of
flexibility and discretion to the arbitration Tribunal in its use of
various procedural mechanisms, such as when or how it would
incorporate expert evidence. 299 The incorporation of the
UNCITRAL rules, then, provides an example of how a
preexisting set of rules can be incorporated or woven into specific
ad hoc adjudicatory institutions. This in turn suggests a similar
possibility for how ad hoc institutions might do the same with
the law of attribution.
As a general matter, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
was successful in processing a large number of claims on both
sides. Almost all of the claims brought by the United States were
decided,300 and those decided in favor of U.S. claimants were all
paid in full. 30 1 On the Iranian side, the United States recently
agreed in 2016 to pay a settlement of $1.7 billion dollars to settle
one of its longstanding claims. 30 2 For some, then, the Tribunal
296 Id. art. 111(1).
297 Id. art. 111(2).
298 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State
Arbitration, UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTL TRADE L.,
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-
2013/UNCITRAL-Arbitration-Rules-2013-e.pdf [http://perma.cc/2LB6-7GH7].
299 See Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, Applying the UNCITRAL Rules: The Experience of
the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 4 BERKELEY J. INTL L. 266, 267 (1986)
("It is clear that the broad base and inherent elasticity of the UNCITRAL Rules
are features which have proved invaluable in laying a firm foundation for the
development of these rules. Changes have been introduced, however, to
accommodate the special needs of this unique arbitral body as its work has
proceeded."); Michael Straus, The Practice of the Iran- U.S. Claims Tribunal in
Receiving Evidence from Parties and from Experts, 3 J. INT'L ARB. 57, 63 & n.7
(1986) (noting, for example, the discretion granted to the Tribunal under
Article 25(4) to allow persons identified as a party or party representative to
remain in the room during a hearing, as part of the discretion "to determine
the manner in which witnesses are examined," as well as the general exercise
of discretion in evaluating conditions for summoning and presenting expert
testimony).
300 Office of the Legal Adviser, Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, U.S. DEP'T ST.,
http://www.state.gov/s//3199.htm [http://perma.cc/LD9Y-MMVN].
301 See Charles N. Brower, Lessons to be Drawn from the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal, 9 J. INT'L ARB. 51, 51 (1992).
302 See Elise Labott, Nicole Gaouette & Kevin Liptak, US Sent Plane with $400
Million in Cash to Iran, CNN (Aug. 4, 2016, 11:53 AM ET),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/03/politics/us-sends-plane-iran-400-million-cash/
[http://perma.cc/YPH2-4XP9] (describing a settlement of $400 million and $1.3
billion in interest).
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presented much cause for celebration.3 3 These supporters point
to the Tribunal's track record, and the fact that it has processed
over 3900 cases since its inception, which generally cover all but
a few large and complex claims between the two states. 304
Beyond the number of cases it has addressed, others, like
Richard M. Mosk, have lauded the Tribunal for its ability to
practically and successfully implement a full suite of procedural
rules for adjudicating its cases, rules that helped to effectively
navigate complicated cases such that its procedures "may serve
as guides for future tribunals."30 5 In fact, the Tribunal has also
served as a guide in other ways-one study by Christopher
Gibson and Christopher Drahozal demonstrated that Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal decisions have been cited as
precedent by the ICSID Tribunal,306 suggesting that an ad hoc
tribunal's decisions may still exert a broader effect beyond the
immediate controversies that it adjudicates.
There are limitations, however, to raising attribution claims
with an ad hoc approach. Despite the fact that the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal's decisions have been cited in other
tribunals, more general surveys of arbitration citations
demonstrate that arbitration courts' case citations tend to vary
significantly according to context; while the Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and the ICC had
relatively few citations to prior awards, the Court of Arbitration
for Sports and domain name arbitration systems had nearly
ubiquitous citation of precedent in their rulings.30 7 In the case of
attribution, it is easy to see these rulings going to the way of the
former. Given the wide range of factual variation in cyber-attack
attribution cases-ranging from the type of cyber-attack3 8 to
303 Others have levied a number of criticisms towards the way the Tribunal
functioned. Charles N. Brower, for example, noted that the judges "could never
seem to agree on anything very much and adopt a uniform Tribunal
jurisprudence, even on fairly simple issues." Brower, supra note 301, at 54.
Brower also took serious issue with the Tribunal s ability to adjudicate cases
in a timely fashion, as well as the fact that some 2500 of these claims were
resolved with lump-sum payments, precluding a truly individualized
assessment of claims that, in his eyes, produces an inadequate remedy. See id.
at 52.
304 David P. Stewart, Stephen M. Schwebel & Ruth Teitelbaum, The Latest Award
from the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: The Line Between
Approximation of Damages and Ruling ex Aequo et Bono, 109 AM. J. INT'L L.
369, 369 (2015).
305 See Mosk, supra note 287, at 822-23.
306 Christopher S. Gibson & Christopher R. Drahozal, Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal Precedent in Investor-State Arbitration, 23 J. INT'L ARB. 521, 540-44
(2006).
301 Christopher R. Drahozal, Empirical Findings on International Arbitration: An
Overview, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAw 38-39 (forthcoming)
(citing a study by Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler).
308 See, e.g., Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph & Shankar Sastry, A Taxonomy of Cyber
Attacks on SCADA Systems, 2011 INTL CONFERENCES ON INTERNET OF THINGS
2018
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the level of secrecy attached to a state's evidence supporting
attribution-tribunals would likely be reluctant to rely too
heavily on prior cases given their potential for factual
dissimilarity.
Ad hoc tribunals also face a particularly unique challenge in
establishing the incentives for participation. Because they
frequently arise out of bilateral agreements, they depend on
states having (or treating each other as having) relatively equal
standing. Moreover, they depend upon particular historical
contexts during which each state has sufficient grievances
against the other to provide the incentive to form such a tribunal
in the first place. While such a circumstance is certainly possible
in the cyber-attack context-states may have scourged each
other with mutual cyber-aggression-it is difficult to imagine a
state voluntarily admitting its culpability and approaching the
other with the desire for an orderly resolution. It is especially
difficult to imagine states having sufficiently equal leverage in
this context to produce the circumstances that would force both
to the bargaining table. And even where there is sufficient
incentive for states to form these ad hoc tribunals, a crucial
limitation is that ad hoc tribunals are reactive to such harm, and
therefore seem after-the-fact and retrospective rather than
forward-looking.30 9 While it is true that the previous two models
can only adjudicate claims over attacks that have already
happened, the sheer fact of a standing judicial institution
represents a temporal longevity that allows its decisions to cast
a greater shadow on the future. Thus, the ad hoc model, while
perhaps most effective in particular factual circumstances that
might call for it, presents a less effective model for implementing
the law of attribution.
CONCLUSION
When describing the origins of the International Court of
Justice, Robert Kolb breaks down its path into three parts:
0 the organization of a comprehensive
scheme of arbitral justice;
& CYBER, PHYSICAL & SOC. COMPUTING 380, 383-87 (listing types of attacks,
including hardware attacks, buffer overflows, SQL injections, diagnostic server
attacks, Address Resolution Protocol Spoofing, chain/loop attacks, SYN floods,
and DNS forgery).
309 See Ralph Zacklin, The Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals, 2 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 541, 542 (2004). While Zacklin appears equally critical of standing
international courts' (i.e., the International Criminal Court's) ability to do
better, more recent systematic assessments demonstrate that standing courts
like the ICC do have some deterrent effect. See Hyeran Jo & Beth A. Simmons,
Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?, 70 INT'L ORG. 443 (2016).
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0 the attempt to create a permanent and
compulsory 'arbitral court'; [and]
0 the creation of an institutional court,
linked to the League of Nations -the
Permanent Court of International Justice
(PCIJ).310
Crucially, the first step to the creation of this regime was the
creation of the legal scheme-something has to first be imagined
before it can be created. And with each step, the vision of law
becomes incrementally more specific, until that vision has taken
the form of an actual institution of law. The law of attribution
proposed here seeks to begin drawing that vision for how states
can redress the threat of cyber-attacks through law. The law of
attribution, of course, is a far more modest project than the
initial concept of an international court of justice. But it is
nonetheless an important one, and one made all the more
possible by the foundations laid by prior institutions of
international law.
This Note has imagined a legal framework for attributing a
cyber-attack to the state responsible, and has proposed the
procedural rules that would allow a state to legitimately make
such a claim. By adopting an adversarial model, the law of
attribution can situate both parties to balance the burden of
producing adequate information on such an uncertain subject.
Through the default burden of proof-proving attribution by a
preponderance of evidence-the law of attribution can account
for the technological difficulties of proving attribution by
allowing the law to recognize when circumstantial evidence can
suffice to link an attack to its source. Furthermore, by using the
test of virtual control, the law of attribution can more
expansively hold states accountable for the non-state actors
linked to them, with an affirmative defense of due diligence to
create a safe harbor for states that exercise the appropriate level
of oversight over such actors. Finally, procedural rules allowing
for ex parte and in camera review of evidence would
accommodate states' concerns about the secrecy of their
sensitive intelligence, while also preserving the capacity to use
relevant evidence in bringing a claim of attribution.
Through such rules, the law of attribution aims to make
transparent the source behind cyber-attacks. Cyber-attacks
have long been able to go unchecked underneath a veil of
secrecy,311 and states have long been able to elude responsibility
for conducting such attacks. While state actors like the United
310 Kolb, supra note 241, at 5.
311 See generally FRED KAPLAN, DARK TERRITORY: THE SECRET HISTORY OF CYBER
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States may have once believed themselves to have a
disproportionate advantage in the realm of cyber-warfare,312 the
increasing proliferation of cyber-attacks may have sprawled
beyond any single state's control, threatening not only the
security of states but the stability of their private and civic
institutions as well. With the increasing costs of insecurity and
uncertainty associated with a world of unfettered cyber-attacks,
states may soon come to recognize the need for legal institutions
to begin reining them in by holding each other accountable.
Nonetheless, recent years seem to show some tears in the
international fabric. With the occurrence of events like Brexit
and the increasing rise of individuals like Donald Trump and
Marine Le Pen who endorse protectionist policies, 313 there
appears to be a retreat from the international institutions that
characterized much of the growth of international law in the
past few decades. The protectionist threat is compounded by the
increasing threat posed by the rise of cyber-attacks, especially
their more pernicious uses in potentially interfering with
electoral politics and the legitimacy of domestic institutions. All
of these threats, taken together, would appear to undermine
faith in the abilities and stability of state sovereignty and
international law.
It is easy to get caught in the political winds of the present
moment and lose sight of the longer path forward. But the
increasing uncertainty today is all the more reminder of the need
for further development in international law, not further retreat
from it. Imagining the new legal frameworks that we might
implement is one step. But the theory of law is only one part of
the fight. Theory alone cannot rest on its laurels-the practical
concerns and affairs of the world, state and otherwise, run amok
unless such theory can be bent to meet them. The procedural
rules set forth by the law of attribution dictate not just the
technical features that must be met for a claim to succeed, but
the practical costs that accompany them. In doing so, it
concretizes the costs of legal institutions to weigh against the
costs of uncertainty in the ungoverned status quo. It may be that
states and their constituents can tolerate a world without law to
check the threat of cyber- security. But with a surer sense of what
costs the law of attribution may entail, states may soon come to
realize that the havoc of unbounded cyber-attacks are too costly
to ignore.
312 See Danny Vinik, America's Secret Arsenal, POLITICO (Dec. 9, 2015, 4:57 AM
EST), http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2015/12/defense-department-
cyber-offense-strategy-000331 [http://perma.cc/WWQ9-S687].
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